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Abstract
The topic of this essay is a class of properties that are naturally  predicated 
both of the objects of experience, and experiences themselves: temporal 
properties. I begin by introducing the notion of a temporal property, before 
arguing that a basic ‘snapshot’ picture of temporal experience cannot 
accommodate our experience of these properties as properly  conceived. 
Having completed this preliminary  work, in chapter two I set out some of 
the key  distinctions that will inform the argument of the essay; Dainton’s 
distinction between ‘extensionalism’ and ‘retentionalism’, and more 
importantly the notion of ‘temporal mirroring’. In chapter three, I focus on a 
major argument for mirroring from Phillips (2010), from the ‘transparency’ 
of experience. I present several ways by  which this argument should be 
resisted, the main reason being that the notion of ‘transparency’ employed is 
not sufficiently  clear to yield the conclusion Phillips requires. The 
discussion in chapter three also considers the notion of ‘seeming’ with 
regard to experience, and whether Phillips’ argument can be resisted by 
clarifying the notion of seeming at stake in the argument. In chapter four, I 
focus on some well-known empirical cases which I argue provide a further 
case against temporal mirroring; the Color-phi case and the case of the 
‘cutaneous rabbit’. I consider a major response to these cases from Phillips 
(2014a), who argues that we should reconceive of experience as 
anhomoeomerous, and argue that this response faces numerous problems. 
The main conclusion of the essay is that we have good reason to reject 
temporal mirroring. In the final chapter, I briefly explore further issues that 
arise from the debate I have been considering, concluding that questions 
over the unity  and continuity of experience over time still remain to be 
adequately addressed by all parties to the debate.
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1. Temporal properties
Introduction
The topic of this essay is the question of how we perceive temporal properties, and 
more specifically the nature of the relation between the temporal properties (or, 
temporal structure) of the events we experience and the temporal properties of our 
experiences themselves. The literature relevant to this broad philosophical area is large 
and disparate, with numerous authors choosing to set out the central problems, and the 
available responses, in different ways. For example, Dainton (2000, 2010a) chooses to 
focus on what he terms ‘extensional’ and ‘retentional’ views of experience in his 
influential approach to temporal consciousness. Others, such as Lee (2014a) choose to 
focus on the relationship  between experiences and their neural (physical) realizers 
instead, and implicitly  rejects the taxonomy that Dainton has proposed. In this first 
chapter, I will set up what I take to be the central problem of temporal experience and in 
doing so focus on the relation between the two temporal structures mentioned above, 
rather than specifically  the nature of experiences themselves (though that question will 
become relevant). Before, I set up the central problem, however, I first  wish to discuss 
what I take to be some important features of our temporal experience that will inform 
the discussion throughout the essay.
Temporal, spatial and colour properties
In everyday scenarios, we are in constant  experiential contact with a host  of temporal 
phenomena. A simple walk down the street typically involves apprehending all sorts of 
temporal properties and relations; the sound of one bird’s call following another, the 
changing appearance of a tree as it  blows in the wind, and the long wail of a siren as an 
ambulance drives past. In being acquainted with these features of the world, we are 
presented with temporal properties of objects and events; or, to use the language of 
representationalism, we represent temporal properties in our experience, properties that 
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are necessarily instantiated over time. The succession of one birdcall after another, the 
changing arrangement of the leaves on the tree, and the duration of the ambulance siren 
are all temporal properties that feature immediately  in our experience, arguably as 
clearly  as other properties of objects such as colour, or size (Dainton 2010a). I will take 
these kinds of experiences to be part of the data that a good theory of temporal 
experience should be able to account for, the implication being that any theory of 
experience (or consciousness more generally) that does not  take seriously  this basic 
phenomenology should be called into doubt. In Phillips’ (2014a) terms, this way of 
conceiving of the data to be explained concerning temporal experience signifies a strong 
‘realist’ commitment to temporal properties, and this is a commitment that most 
perceptual theorists (if not all) accept.
Our everyday experience of the world seems to involve the representation (or 
presentation) of a class of properties I will term ‘temporal properties’. As previously 
mentioned, I take temporal properties to be the sort of properties that are necessarily 
instantiated over an interval of time: the key examples that will play  a central role in the 
argument of this essay  are succession (a kind of change), and duration, which are 
temporal properties of events. Whilst there may plausibly  be more properties to add to 
this list, for the purposes of this essay I will consider just these two properties, taking 
them to be paradigm examples of the kinds of temporal properties we ordinarily 
experience. In setting up the central problem to which the argument of my essay will 
pertain, I first want to make more explicit the kind of claim on the part  of the realist 
about temporal properties, with reference to the cases of succession, duration and 
motion.
Succession: consider hearing three tones, one after the other: A, B and C#, forming a 
seamless sequence. It seems very natural to say that there are two data perceived here; 
the tones themselves, but also their succession; we perceive B as succeeding A and C# 
as succeeding B. If this succession was merely inferred from the perception of A, B and 
C# (or perceived indirectly in any  other relevant sense), the experience of the three 
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notes would not have the distinctive phenomenal character that it has; it would be no 
different phenomenally to the perception of A, B and C# each as 5 minutes apart, say. 
However, the experience of A, B and C# in succession is different; it has a distinctive 
phenomenal character which captures not  only the notes and their respective temporal 
intervals, but also their succession, a relational property between events. (Phillips 2010).
Duration: consider a case where one hears a single note sustained for an extended 
period of time; perhaps at the opera. At first, one apprehends the note, but after an 
interval of time has passed, another datum enters the experience: the perception of the 
note as lasting for a sustained interval. The experience gives rise to the feeling that the 
note has lasted some time: this feeling forms an additional part of the phenomenal 
character of the experience, over and above the impression of hearing the note. If this 
duration was merely inferred from the perception of the note for more than an instant of 
time, the experience of the note would not have the distinctive phenomenal character 
that it has; we would get no extra phenomenal notion of the duration at all given in 
immediate experience. However, it certainly seems as if we do; we seem to hear 
something about the note’s temporal extent, over and above the note itself. The 
phenomenal character captures the duration of the note (Kelly 2005).
Motion: consider a car moving down the street. The car is located at various spatial 
locations over the course of the short part of its journey that is perceptible to you; let’s 
say that  the car is located at position X, then Y, and then Z. It  is certainly  true that we 
perceive the car as being located at each of these three intervals, one after the other; 
however, it isn’t true that this is all that we perceive, for we also experience the car as 
being in motion; we perceive the motion of the car itself. If the motion of the car was 
merely inferred from the perception of the car at  different spatial locations, then it is 
doubtful that the experience would have the phenomenology it in fact does have. We 
seem to perceive the motion of the car as being something over-and-above its changing 
of location over time. The phenomenal character of the experience captures the motion 
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of the car itself. (Broad’s example of seeing the second hand of a clock moving vs 
seeing the hour hand of a clock moving essentially makes the same point (Broad 1923)).
If ‘temporal properties’ are characterized by being necessarily  instantiated over time, 
then succession, duration and motion are all alike in this respect. However, motion can 
be distinguished in the sense that as a property  it takes as its object a physical object. In 
contrast, succession and duration can only  be predicated of events in time. We might say 
in light  of this that motion is only  a temporal property  in a derivative sense; Phillips 
(2009) places change (and therefore motion) in the category of properties that whilst not 
‘strictly’ temporal in the sense of pertaining to events bear a logical connection to time, 
but nevertheless uses the phrase ‘temporal property’ in a loose sense as to include these 
properties (Phillips 2009, p.3). 
However, in this essay, as in the literature, the temporal properties I will be most 
concerned with are succession and duration; the motion case above is merely  used as it 
is a vivid way  of characterizing the claim that temporal properties feature in our 
immediate experience. That the focus will be chiefly on duration and succession here is 
justified by the fact that these are two temporal properties which naturally seem to be 
had by  experiences themselves; or at least, experiences seem to be the sorts of things on 
a naive conception that could possess duration, and succeed each other in time. It is 
worth considering which properties are plausibly predicated of experience itself, and 
which are not, in order to explain my restriction of ‘temporal properties’ to ‘duration 
and succession’ in this essay. Without committing to a view about the precise nature of 
experience, I assume here that we can sensibly  distinguish between the sorts of 
properties that might be truly predicated of entities like experiences, and those that 
should not be. For example, it  is natural to talk of ‘an unpleasant experience’, or ‘a 
joyful experience’; however, in making such predications, we seek to highlight 
something of how our experiences seem to us, but we would not literally accept that 
unpleasantness and joyfulness are the sort of properties that could sensibly be applied to 
experiences qua (partly) physical events in time. In the case of temporal properties, 
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however, when we predicate properties of duration and succession of experiences, we 
mean to make the predications more literally; stating that ‘my experiences are 
successive’ is not merely a reflection of how our experiences seem to us, but is to 
predicate experiences qua events in time with temporal aspects. The key contrast I wish 
to make in claiming that experiences themselves naturally  seem to have temporal 
properties is not between temporal properties and ‘seeming’ properties such as 
unpleasantness, but temporal properties and other properties instantiated by worldly 
entities, such as spatial and colour properties. Many  events and objects can be truly 
predicated with spatial and colour properties, as well a temporal properties: for 
example, ‘a large explosion’, or ‘a red flash’. Explosions and flashes can be both large 
and red as well as long-lasting (i.e. have duration). However, the starting-point in my 
inquiry  into temporal properties in this essay  is the observation that it does not seem 
correct to predicate experiences with spatial or colour properties in this fashion, whilst it 
does seem natural to predicate experiences of temporal properties. In the ordinary way 
we conceive of our own experience, we much more naturally  assent to propositions 
such as ‘I had a long-lasting taste sensation’, or ‘I heard the crash before I heard the 
bang’, than predications such as ‘I had a large experience’, or ‘I had a red experience’; 
the latter predications just seem misguided. It is intuitions of this form that  have caused 
a large group of philosophers to take seriously the contrast in metaphysical terms, and 
formulate explicitly  theories of temporal experience that posit a systematic relationship 
between the temporal properties of objects and the temporal properties of experiences 
(for example, Foster (1979), Dainton (2000), and Phillips (2009)). Whilst I will 
ultimately  seek to reject a central principle of these theories in this essay, I take as my 
starting point the intuition that temporal properties are significantly different from 
spatial and colour properties when it  comes to experience: experience itself appears to 
have a temporal aspect in a way  that it  does not appear to have a spatial or a coloured 
aspect.
Temporal properties, then, might plausibly be had of experiences themselves as well as 
their objects (these objects being, in the cases of succession and duration, events). We 
13
might coherently  talk of, for example, a succession of experiences, or an experience that 
has a duration of x seconds in objective time. This fact is not true of many other 
properties we would like to predicate of objects and events. Spatial or colour properties, 
as just seen, are arguably never predicable of experiences; experiences are just not the 
sort of things that could instantiate these properties, or at least  this seems to be the case. 
Hence as we have seen, an experience of a large red car is in no cases itself red, or large. 
In the case of many temporal properties, however, the question as to the relationship 
between the temporal properties predicated of the objects we experience and the 
temporal properties predicated of those same experiences is one of the central questions 
in the philosophy of temporal perception, and it is in giving an account of this relation 
that the main approaches to the problem can be distinguished. As I argue, the problem 
of temporal experience is introduced explicitly  upon consideration of one key  similarity 
between temporal and spatial/colour perception, and one key difference. The intuition 
behind the above three cases is the intuition that we perceive temporal properties as 
immediately as we perceive spatial/temporal properties; as Phillips and others observe: 
‘we seem to be no less directly acquainted with the temporal structure of the world 
around us than with its spatial structure’ (Phillips 2010 p.177). Alongside this key 
similarity is the essential difference between temporal and spatial perception mentioned 
above: that experience of time necessarily  takes place in time in a way that has no 
spatial analogue. The essential similarity plays a key motivation behind what Dainton 
has called the ‘phenomenological constraint’ on temporal experience: the assertion 
commonly made (including by myself above) that temporal properties are presented or 
represented in immediate experience; I formulate this constraint more precisely in a 
moment. However, the essential difference between temporal and spatial experience 
invites consideration of the temporal properties of experiences as entities existing in 
time, and the relationship between the temporal properties of the objects encountered in 
experience.
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Constraints on temporal experience
Having introduced the starting point of my inquiry  into the nature of temporal 
experience, I will now consider some plausible constraints on temporal experience, 
arguing that when such constraints are agreed upon, certain views in the literature are 
revealed to be implausible. The main purpose of this section is to set the common 
ground in the debate between two key  views concerning temporal experience that I want 
to discuss; the common ground is that so-called ‘cinematic’ or ‘snapshot’ views of 
experience should be rejected because they cannot accommodate these plausible 
constraints. One essential consideration to be advanced here is perhaps one of the most 
prominent statements about temporal experience in the literature, sometimes referred to 
(and largely undisputed) as ‘James’ dictum.’ In his canonical statement of the notion of 
the specious present, James partly  motivates the notion with the following claim: ‘a 
succession of feelings is not, in and of itself, a feeling of succession’ (James 1890, p.
628). Reading ‘feelings’ as equivalent to ‘experiences’, James’ point is that there is no 
entailment from succession as applied to experiences to succession as represented in 
experience. It is unclear whether James has in mind a lack of entailment from a 
succession of experiences to succession being represented in those very same 
experiences, or in experience generally  (viz. the stream of consciousness). The point, 
widely  affirmed including by  Dainton (2010a), Phillips (2009) and others, is that a mere 
succession of experiences as events in objective time is not enough by itself to produce 
a representation or presentation of the property of succession in experience; we need an 
additional fact about experience to ground such a presentation. Consider three 
experiences; hearing a tone A at t1 (at  breakfast), B at  t2 (at lunch), and C# at t3 (at 
dinner). These experiences stand in temporal succession; A precedes B in time, and B 
precedes C#; and furthermore, on reflection we might even  say that  at t3 we perceive 
that it is the case that A, B and C# stand in succession. However, it is not  true to say that 
we perceive A, B and C# as succeeding each other; their succession itself is not 
(re)presented in experience at t3, since A, B and C# are experienced as too far apart  in 
time. This fairly  straightforward failure of entailment between properties in 1 and 
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properties in 3 in the case of succession does not, however, rule out that there could be 
succession experienced as a result  of a succession of experiences, however far apart 
they  happen to be in time, hence ‘in and of itself’. However, an extra ingredient is 
needed in order to ground the fact that succession itself is experienced, as immediately 
as the tones A, B and C#.
James’ dictum is a claim that most parties to the various debates about temporal 
experience are happy to accept. Even so-called ‘anti-realists’ about temporal perception 
such as Dennett (1991) affirm this principle; that it shows that in order to have the 
temporal phenomenology we generally think we have requires something other than a 
series of successive experiences shows, for the anti-realist, that we simply  don’t have 
the temporal phenomenology we generally think we have (Dennett just denies that  we 
have the temporal phenomenology we think we have). For these reasons and others, 
most have preferred to take James’ dictum to demonstrate that we need to add 
something to the ontology of experiences in order to explain our temporal 
phenomenology, rather than subtract something from the phenomenology  itself. 
Dennett’s view, which advocates subtracting from the phenomenology, I consider later 
on in this essay.
A further interesting question that follows from this is whether the converse entailment 
holds; that  is, whether an experience of succession (i.e. succession (re)presented in 
experience) entails a corresponding succession of experiences. Certainly in the case of 
hearing A, B and C# in a short temporal interval, it  seems very hard initially  to conceive 
of experiencing a succession of tones A, B and C# without also having an experience of 
A, then an experience of B, then an experience of C#: a succession of experiences. 
However, the answer is far from straightforward, and depends on more fundamental 
questions concerning the nature of experiences and how they are individuated, and how 
we conceive of an experience in the first place. If experiences are individuated simply  in 
terms of the objects (re)presented, then the entailment under consideration would surely 
follow; for any  tone A experienced, there would be a corresponding experience E(A), 
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the experience of that object. However, there are reasons to think that such a simple 
criterion for individuating experiences is false; we may have an experience where the 
represented object does not in fact exist, for example, or an ‘undirected’ experience, 
such as a feeling of general anxiety. Alternatively, we might, for example, take a view 
similar to Tye (2003), whose ‘one experience’ view doesn’t allow talk of numerous 
individual experiences, strictly speaking; however, one could on this view still hold that 
succession is represented in experience nonetheless. Here is a view on which an 
experience of succession does not entail a succession of experiences, for talk of 
experiences plural is simply incorrect. 
Following on from James’ dictum, the first  constraint on temporal experience that I 
shall consider is the view that (strictly) temporal properties are immediately 
experienced, suggested by the three cases above. Following Dainton (2010a), I term it 
‘the phenomenological constraint’ on temporal experience:
The phenomenological  constraint (PC): temporal properties such as succession and 
duration are immediately experienced.
This formulation of the constraint, however, makes use of an additional important 
notion made both by Dainton and others (though rarely elucidated in the temporal 
experience literature); the notion of ‘immediate’ or ‘direct’ perception, a loaded concept. 
Why is this addition required in setting up the phenomenological constraint as 
illustrated by the three examples of succession, duration and motion above? The answer 
can be made clear by  a distinction between two different kinds of perception: perceiving 
that x, and simply perceiving x. To take an example from Dretske (1995), a person 
might see that her car’s petrol tank is empty without actually perceiving the emptiness 
itself, as a property of the tank. This is the very distinction that the force of the above 
three cases is grounded in, and the examples make explicit this distinction. Nobody, 
presumably, would argue that we perceive that various events and objects stand in the 
temporal relation of succession; even the most hard-line anti-realist about temporal 
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perception would agree to this. It is because of this that it  is necessary to invoke ‘direct’ 
perception to distinguish the second case from the first; direct perception in terms of 
‘seeing/perceiving x’ as contrasted with ‘seeing/perceiving that x (is the case)’. The 
distinction is a straightforward one, but the task of specifying what exactly  constitutes 
direct perception is far from straightforward; in what sense is the perception of temporal 
properties direct? The manner in which Dainton (2010a) sets up the phenomenological 
constraint takes as crucial the claim that the perception of temporal properties is of a 
similar nature as the perception of spatial and colour properties; that these properties are 
represented in experience in a similarly  immediate manner. Phillips (2010) agrees, 
affirming the key  similarity between temporal and spatial perception mentioned above: 
‘we seem to be no less directly acquainted with the temporal structure of the world 
around us than with its spatial structure’ (p.177). If this is indeed the case (though there 
may be other ways in which one could set up the phenomenological constraint without 
relying on this analogy), the question of providing an account of ‘direct’ perception of 
temporal properties is significantly  related  to the question of providing an account of 
‘direct’ perception of spatial and colour properties. The idea is that whatever grounds 
the fact that when I perceive a large red object in my visual field I directly  perceive its 
magnitude and redness will be the same sort  of thing that (at least partially) grounds my 
direct perception of temporal properties such as succession and duration.
Here is not the place to go into a detailed investigation of the various differing accounts 
of direct perception, but something must be said about the sense in which ‘direct’ should 
not be used here in relation to temporal properties. We can be neutral here on the 
question as to whether naive realism or ‘strong’ representationalism is true (Chalmers 
2005); in the representationalist  case, ‘veridical’ perception is enough to be consistent 
with the thesis that we perceive temporal properties directly (Crane 2011). The key 
point to note, I take it, is that temporal properties are partially  perceived in the same 
basic manner as spatial/colour properties, and represented in experience as such, 
whether the nature of that  perception be disjunctivist, strong representationalist, or 
something else. Chuard (2012) explicitly makes a contrast between two interpretations 
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of direct perception starting with a familiar, ‘metaphysical’ conception; that of Jackson 
(1977), on which to directly  perceive x is to perceive x ‘in virtue of nothing’ (Chuard 
2012 p.5). On this view, a perception of x does not depend on any  other further 
perceptual experience, or indeed any  other kind of psychological state. What reason 
might we have to reject this reading of ‘direct’ perception? The answer is suggestive of 
a second constraint on temporal experience, which Chuard (2012) terms the ‘relational 
constraint’:
The relational constraint (RC): for any relation R, a subject S can perceive R between 
x and y only if S perceives both its relata x and y [in a single experience] (Chuard 2012 
p.3). 
The relations at issue in the topic at hand are relations between non-simultaneous 
events, of which succession is the most prominent example. The relational constraint 
lies at the very heart of the problem of temporal experience; that it is true explains, 
along with PC,  exactly  why a ‘cinematic’ or ‘snapshot’ view of perception, which has it 
that both experiences and their contents as entirely  momentary, is false. In his 
formulation of RC, Chuard curiously omits ‘in a single experience’, which results in a 
principle that is too weak. With this omission, perceiving succession merely  requires 
both events in succession to be perceived at some point; however, it  is doubtful whether 
we ‘perceive’ the succession at all between A and B if A takes place in 2013 and B in 
2014, for example; certainly  not if PC is correct. To make the principle consistent with 
Chuard’s own examples concerning colour/spatial perception (‘it’s plausible that I 
wouldn’t be able to see the difference between the shade of red on the left and the darker 
one on the right if I couldn’t see both shades’ p.3), this addition is necessary. With 
reference to the above example of perceiving three tones A, B and C#, the relational 
constraint more generally  dictates that we cannot perceive the succession of tones A, B 
and C# without experiencing these tones themselves; that we perceive the succession is 
(partly) in virtue of experiencing the tones themselves. This is entirely plausible, and 
indeed it  is very hard to see how ‘I perceive B as succeeding A’ could be true if I do not 
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also perceive events A and B. However, if this is the case, then Jackson’s 
‘metaphysical’ reading of direct perception cannot be the correct reading for the above 
formulation of the phenomenal constraint on temporal experience; for we want to hold 
that the succession is directly  perceived despite the fact  that, according to the relational 
constraint, it is perceived in virtue of individual perceptions of the events in succession. 
For this reason, we should reject Jackson’s reading of ‘direct’ as ‘perceived in virtue of 
nothing’ with regard to the phenomenological constraint on temporal experience. 
However, Chuard’s proposed alternative, direct perception as characterized as being 
‘experienced by means of sensory perception exclusively, devoid of any meddling from 
any other kind of conscious state.’ (Chuard 2012 p.5) is also extremely problematic. It  is 
highly  questionable whether we possess a ‘time-sense’ in the Jamesian sense (James 
1890 p.611); that is, something that James calls a ‘myopic organ’, which functions in a 
manner similar to the eye, for example. This simply seems like an unrealistic proposal; 
if the relational constraint is correct, and even if perception of temporal properties 
depends on perceiving events in time by means of the senses, it does not follow by  the 
relational constraint that the perception of the succession of the events itself is sensory; 
such a proposal seems inherently unlikely, is is not required for the sort of ‘immediate’ 
notion of direct perception we should have in mind, brought out by the contrast  between 
perceiving that  x, and perceiving x, or as x. Whilst the manner in which we enjoy direct 
perception of temporal properties is similar with how we perceive spatial and colour 
properties in terms of its immediacy in experience, this does not  entail that both are 
perceived through exclusively sensory  means. The crucial claim is that  both the events 
in succession and their succession itself are represented in experience in a similar 
manner, though not necessarily through identical means. It is a further question as to the 
nature of these means.
The cinematic view
If the phenomenological and relational constraints as formulated above are correct, 
matters of direct perception set aside, we have a clear reason why a ‘snapshot’ view of 
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temporal experience cannot succeed in providing an adequate account of temporal 
experience. To see how RC and PC form a strong case against the snapshot view, it is 
worth setting it out as follows (from Grush 2007):
There are a number of ways this view of experience might be articulated, but  all such 
views take as essential that both the contents of experience and the experiences 
themselves are momentary (or very short), and are correlated by the formation of static 
perceptual snapshots at different times. A dense succession of such momentary 
experiences is taken to ground the continuity  of experience over time. On the snapshot 
view, our stream of consciousness exists merely  in virtue of having different momentary 
experiences at  different times; a series of static, momentary experiences with 
momentary contents all ‘run together’ in experience.
With this view thus described, we are now in a position to see how the two constraints 
on temporal experience that I have described PC and RC fit together, and in doing so 
provide a good argument against the snapshot view; in fact, the rejection of the snapshot 
view on these grounds directly leads to what has been described as ‘the problem’ of 
temporal experience. On the snapshot view, both experiences themselves and their 
contents are momentary. PC, however, requires that temporal properties, properties that 
are necessarily instantiated over time, are experienced directly, as immediately 
(re)presented in our experience as more basic sensory perceptions. However, in the case 
of succession, RC requires that if succession is to be perceived at all, its relata must also 
be perceived. If the relational constraint as described above is correct, no experience on 
the snapshot view will be able to provide perceptual contact with the various relata of 
the succession relation; there is no cross-temporal perceptual access which is required 
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(by RC) for such an experience. This fact directly  leads to the above-mentioned James’ 
dictum concerning succession; on the snapshot view, all we are provided with is a 
succession of experiences, which is not sufficient for an experience of succession, 
which follows from PC and RC. Since events in succession need necessarily  to be 
spread across time (otherwise they would be simultaneous), and since succession is 
perceived partly in virtue of perceiving its relata (according to the relational constraint), 
then our perception of succession needs necessarily to be spread across time, at least in 
some sense: temporal extension of some aspect  of our experience is required. That  is, if 
both PC and RC are to be satisfied, some aspect of experience needs to be extended 
through time in order to ground the direct perception of relational temporal properties 
such as succession. If the argument above is correct, then the prospects for this view of 
temporal experience are dim. However, what are the prospects for a snapshot view that 
simply  denies the truth of the phenomenological constraint (PC), and thus avoids the 
above argument against the experience of temporal properties such as succession? 
Unsurprisingly, the majority of theorists who might be thought of as subscribing to a 
snapshot view take this second option, since to combine such a view with PC appears 
unworkable, given the aforementioned considerations. I take the account of temporal 
experience set out by Dennett (1991) as the paradigm example of a snapshot view that 
denies PC. In discussion of this radical and revisionary view of experience, which holds 
that the ways we think and talk are poor guides to experiential phenomenal reality, I 
introduce a final constraint on temporal experience:
The diachronic unity constraint (UC):  individual experiences stand in a certain 
relation/relations such that they are unified in a single, continuous stream of 
consciousness. 
As with the two previous constraints mentioned, I do not take this principle to be 
particularly controversial; in fact, it is a plausible and widely held claim about the 
character of our conscious experience. When we attend to experience, our 
consciousness possess a seamless, flowing quality that persists as long as we are 
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conscious, and characterizes our perception of the world; hence the widely used 
‘stream’ metaphor. However, Dennett’s theory holds to a radically  fragmented picture of 
consciousness, on which the dense series of momentary snapshot experiences is not 
supplemented with any further experiential (phenomenal) feature; a view which, I 
argue, leads to a rejection of UC above, despite UC being a basic desiderata of an 
adequate theory  of consciousness. Dennett is keen to avoid what he terms a ‘content-
vehicle’ confusion with respect  to experience; we must make a distinction between the 
timings of the represented temporal content, and the timings of the neural realizers 
which give rise to the same content (Hurley 1998). This is an important suggestion, but 
in Dennett’s case it is motivated by a sharp disconnect between what we take to be the 
nature of our own experiences, and the true nature of those experiences. It is not the 
case, on Dennett’s anti-realist view, that we enjoy in immediate experience a unified, 
continuous stream of consciousness; rather that our brain simply receives disparate 
sensory  inputs, and by means of ‘perceptual interpolation’ fills in the gaps in conscious 
experience, based on our beliefs and subconscious expectations about the apparent 
consistency of our visual field over time. Dennett first takes examples from ‘blind spot’ 
cases in the visual fields, cases where neuroscientific evidence is taken to suggest that 
there is in fact a fuzzy expanse in the field of vision of a subject despite the subject’s 
tendency to think and act as if there isn’t (Dennett  1991, p.331). Dennett then 
straightforwardly takes this case of spatial/visual perception and applies it directly to 
perception of temporal phenomena. Our consciousness over time is thus taken to be as 
fragmented and hole-ridden as our consciousness at a moment; both synchronic (at a 
time) and diachronic (over time) unity are sacrificed in a view that posits a fundamental 
disconnect between how our experience seems to us on introspection, how we form 
beliefs about  it and report on its contents, and how our stream of consciousness actually 
is. The ‘multiple drafts’ model of experience that is developed in light of these 
considerations posits ‘a parallel stream of conflicting and constantly revised 
contents’ (Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992, p.1): there is no single stream of 
consciousness in which experiences are diachronically  unified in this view; and the two 
parallel ‘streams’ of content posited instead hardly  deserve the use of the metaphor, 
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since there is nothing continuous about them. Dennett’s view is characteristic of a fully 
‘bottom-up’ approach to consciousness that puts no evidential value in the deliverances 
of our own conscious introspection; but it is worth pointing out that in order to hold a 
‘bottom-up’ approach to consciousness which gives weight  to neuroscientific findings 
but also respects the phenomenology, we need not abolish the notion of evidence from 
phenomenology and introspection; for example, Lee (2014a, 2014c) gives such an 
approach that does not rely upon rejecting many plausible phenomenological 
considerations. Though it raises interesting questions concerning the relationship 
between phenomenology, introspection and belief, I argue that Dennett’s account should 
be rejected partly  on the basis that it  denies PC, but  chiefly because it leads to a 
rejection of UC as well, which I take to be an even more plausible constraint on our 
temporal experience.
I have argued that it is through considering three plausible constraints on temporal 
experience, PC, RC and UC, we must reject the basic ‘snapshot’ view of experience, 
and best articulate the basic problem of temporal experience. However, the 
methodological basis of this introductory  chapter of this essay comes from the thought 
that the basic snapshot view of experience, whilst probably false, is to some extent 
intuitively plausible. At least, I find it to some extent intuitively  plausible. The view 
plays an interesting role in the literature around the various problems of temporal 
experience; many theorists affirm it as the ‘standard’ view (e.g. Grush 2007 p.5) or as 
good basic, intuitive picture (Kelly  2005 p.1), after which it is usually  quickly 
dismissed. In this sense the snapshot view plays a dialectical role rather than a role as a 
view to be seriously considered: only  Chuard (2012) differs in this regard. I think there 
is much to be said for the basic thought behind the view; that perceptual experience is 
simple, unextended and simply takes as its input perceptual snapshots of the world at 
each moment. Many treatments of the various problems of temporal experience take it 
as given that this view is false; I have at least tried to give the view the more 
comprehensive treatment that  it probably deserves. A proponent of the snapshot view 
may ‘bite the bullet’ by denying both the PC and UC (for example, Dennett 1991); or 
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they  may  deny RC (for example, Chuard 2012). I think on balance, however, such 
attempts involve denying other more deep-seated intuitions about the nature of 
experience. Following this discussion, I take the best exposition of the problem of 
temporal experience to be formulated in light of these three constraints on temporal 
experience. The question that naturally arises is the following: how can the basic 
snapshot ontology of experience be supplemented in order to satisfy the phenomenal 
constraint, given that the basic snapshot picture has been ruled out by considerations 
involving the relational constraint? Specifically, what sort of relationship must there be 
between the temporal structure of experience and the temporal structure of its objects in 
order to satisfy  the above constraints? The point takes us back to James’ dictum: ‘A 
succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. And since, to our 
successive feelings, a feeling of their own succession is added, that must be treated as 
an additional fact requiring its own special elucidation’ (James 1890 p.628). In 
addressing the above concerns, the main conclusion of this thesis will be that we have 
good reason to doubt one prominent way of answering the above question; the view that 
experience ‘mirrors’ the temporal structure of its objects, or ‘inherits’ their temporal 
structure. In the next  chapter, I elucidate upon this mirroring/inheritance view and the 
terminology  involved, and then in later chapters give arguments to the conclusion that it 
should be rejected.
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2. Mirroring and inheritance
Dainton’s debate
We have seen the snapshot view to be false: in it’s anti-realist form, it must deny PC 
and UC, whilst  no realist formulation of the snapshot view can plausibly be given 
without denying RC. The rejection of the snapshot view prompts the consideration and 
comparison of two temporal structures (sets of temporal properties and relations): the 
temporal structure of experience, and the temporal structure of its objects (which are, 
for the temporal properties we are interested in, events). When we reject  the snapshot 
view, a view which seems to inevitably lead to affirming that neither experience nor its 
objects have any discernible temporal structure, the question arises as to how the two 
structures are related. James’ dictum provides an important insight into this question: it 
is not sufficient for an experience to represent a temporal property that the experience or 
a set of experiences instantiate that temporal property. More must be said. I will now 
introduce the key  views in the debate I wish to focus on, concerning the relation the two 
temporal structures in question bear to one another.
The debate concerning experience and its temporal properties, and their relation to the 
temporal properties represented in experience, has been dominated recently  by 
terminology  introduced by  Barry  Dainton (2000, 2010a). Dainton’s primary concern in 
much of his work is how to give a plausible interpretation to what has been referred to 
(most notably in James 1890, citing ‘E.R Clay’, p.609) as the ‘specious present’. 
Motivated by the need to give a satisfactory account of this notion, Dainton formulates 
his taxonomy of views concerning experience as providing different interpretations of 
the basic specious present idea. Dainton’s main distinction is between ‘extensionalist’ 
and ‘retentionalist’ families of views, but though I will reference these views in the 
course of my critique, the proposed distinction between extensionalism and 
retentionalism is not the distinction that I take to lie at the heart  of the problem I am 
concerned with. As I detailed above, the question on the table is not simply the question 
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as to the particular ontology of experience (e.g. extended or momentary), nor the 
question of how temporal properties are (re)presented in experience, though both these 
further issues are clearly  relevant. The key question I wish to discuss in this essay 
concerns the relationship between the temporal properties represented in experience, 
and the temporal properties of experiences themselves. Dainton’s characterization of the 
debate about temporal consciousness does not make this concern prior; in his account, 
the question as to this special relationship follows from what he takes to be a more 
fundamental concern, which is whether experiences are extended in time or not. I 
present the issues in reverse: we should decide on the nature of the relationship between 
the two temporal structures before filling in the details as to the precise nature of each 
structure, for no reason other than the source of initial puzzlement was this very 
relationship. Therefore, I will only  briefly  outline Dainton’s ‘extensionalism’ and 
‘retentionalism’ here, before outlining what I take to be the more relevant debate, on the 
premise that the distinctions Dainton begins with do not cut to the heart of the issue that 
we should be most interested in here. 
Dainton’s key  concern, as is ours, is how PC can be satisfied; specifically, what sort of 
nature experience must have in order that PC is satisfied. Having rejected as we have 
done the basic ‘snapshot’ picture of experience, though in less explicit terms, Dainton 
goes on to make a distinction between what he takes to be the two main competing 
views of temporal experience: ‘extensionalism’ and ‘retentionalism’ (Dainton 2010a). 
Dainton begins with James’ notion of the specious present, and cashes out these two 
competing views as rival interpretations of the specious present. For James, the 
‘specious present’ refers to the present moment as it is actually experienced, as 
contrasted to the ‘strict’ or ‘mathematical’ present, which has no duration at  all (James 
1890). For James, the present moment as experienced cannot be momentary: it is ‘no 
knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit 
perched, and from which we look in two directions in time’ (James 1890 p.609). For 
James, the experienced present must apprehend a duration, or interval, of time owing to 
PC; we could not perceive temporal phenomena at all if all we were presented in 
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experience with was a moment, because temporal phenomena are themselves 
necessarily extended in time. Though the actual, ‘mathematical’ present moment may  be 
strictly momentary, the present as given in experience is temporally extended. Thus, in 
motivating the idea of a specious present, James implicitly  rejects the ‘snapshot’ family 
of views which reject that experience gives us apprehension of a duration; his rejection 
can be seen as closely related to the rejection of snapshot theories presented in the 
previous chapter. In his highly metaphorical description of the specious present, James 
explicitly states that  the specious present  sits either side of the strict, mathematical 
present; that is, in a single experience, we are able to apprehend a duration which 
includes objects and events that are located both before and after the actual present. 
Later in his development of the idea in the Theory of Knowledge manuscript, Russell 
modifies the notion of the specious present to incorporate only ‘backwards’ awareness: 
for Russell, we might say that the specious present sits entirely in front of the 
mathematical present in experienced time, thus only allowing access to a short duration 
of the recent past (Russell 1913). Whichever way we choose to understand these 
specifics, however, the key  claim in the notion of the specious present is that in a single 
experience, we a presented with (or represent) an interval of time. For Russell, we can 
only experience temporal properties in a manner consistent with PC if we experience 
time within a specious present. More specifically, the specious present allows for 
multiple entities to be experienced together, or all at once, i.e. in a single experience. So 
for example, when I experience the succession of notes A and B, I am able to apprehend 
both A and B, and their succession, in a single experience; the two notes are contained 
within a single specious present.
The specious present is primarily a thesis about how the world is presented to us in a 
single experience; it is not a thesis concerning the nature of experience itself. Dainton 
introduces the debate between ‘extensionalists’ and ‘retentionalists’ as a way  of 
interpreting the basic specious present  idea in the case of experience itself; these two 
views outline very different conceptions of how experience itself must be if the notion 
of the specious present is upheld. ‘Extensionalists’ hold that individual experiences 
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themselves are extended in time, and commonly across the same interval as their 
specious presents. Thus, if a typical specious present is 2 seconds long, then the 
corresponding experience will also be 2 seconds long; the length of a single experience 
matches the length of the specious present associated with it. The general extensionalist 
picture can be represented in this manner:
       (From Dainton 2010a, section 5.1)
As can be seen from the diagram, the temporal extent of a single, temporally extended 
experience matches the temporal extent of its corresponding specious present. Dainton 
holds that experiences are unified over time (diachronically) in virtue of being related 
by the relation of co-consciousness: we needn’t enter into an analysis of Dainton’s 
chosen unity relation here, so can set aside this part of the view for now. Apart from the 
fact that the experience itself is extended on this picture as well as its content, the 
diagram illustrates another crucial aspect of the extensionalist picture: the claim that 
experiences decompose into further experiences. Thus, the experience of C (whatever 
event or object it  is) and the experience of D are unified by the relation of co-
consciousness to form a further experience, CD; and it is the length of CD that  is the 
same as the length of the specious present. The relation that Dainton takes to hold 
between C, D and CD is a mereological relation; that is to say, the parts of an 
experience (which are also experiences) compose a distinct experience in a similar 
manner in which, for example, a wooden seat and four wooden legs might compose a 
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wooden chair. Again, since my  explanation of the view is brief and chiefly 
methodological, we needn’t at this point get into discussion about this mereological 
view of experience. The key claims of the extensionalist thesis are 1) that experiences 
are things that have a temporal extension which matches that of their specious presents 
and 2) experiences decompose into parts, which are also experiences. On the 
extensionalist picture, then, there is a real sense in which the temporal structure of and 
experience and the temporal structure of its objects are intimately related.
The contrasting view to extensionalism Dainton terms ‘retentionalism’, which I admit I 
find a slightly perverse labelling. If ‘extensionalism’ is named due to its claim that 
experiences are extended and built up of other experiences as parts, then why not label 
the alternative view ‘atomism’, denoting that experiences need not be extended, and do 
not decompose into further experiences (e.g. Lee 2014a, 2014b)? Instead, Dainton uses 
‘retentionalism’, in reference to the fact that this kind of view is often supplemented 
with cognitive faculties such as ‘retention’ or ‘memory’ in order to make it coherent. To 
understand how this is so, the retentionalist these can be represented as follows:
On the retentional picture, we can see that the experience (the vertical arrow) is not 
necessarily extended, but point-like, or momentary. Nevertheless, the content of the 
experience, or what is presented in the experience, has temporal extension; the single 
experience still represents an interval of time, and so can be said to honour the notion of 
the specious present. This is possible because of the diagonal arrow, a ‘backwards’ 
30
representation or retention. The temporal interval necessary  for the perception of 
temporal properties such as duration and succession is made possible by the 
contribution to the content of experience made from such retentions. Retentionalism 
differs from extensionalism in two key  aspects: firstly, the temporal structure of the 
experience itself (if it has one) and the temporal structure of the objects apprehended 
(within the specious present) came come apart in terms of duration; only  the specious 
present is had over an interval. And secondly, experiences on this picture can be 
momentary, and so do not necessarily decompose into parts that are also experiences. 
The view is termed ‘retentionalism’ in Dainton’s terminology because in order for a 
momentary  experience to apprehend a temporal interval, other cognitive faculties need 
to be employed: in this case, retention, or memory, a notion taken from Husserl. The 
retentionalist’s momentary experience is able to apprehend an interval of time because 
that interval is partly constituted by recent memories; the cognitive faculty of memory 
plays a vital role in the representation of a temporal interval. On retentionalism, the 
temporal structure of an experience and the temporal structure of its objects can 
significantly diverge.
Again, since this exposition of Dainton’s view of the debate is brief, there is no space to 
fully  explore these issues; I introduce carving up the debate about temporal experience 
in terms of ‘extensionalism’ and ‘retentionalism’ in order to contrast it  with an 
alternative, and in my view better, way of carving up the debate. I don’t believe that 
Dainton’s contrast between extended (extensionalist) and momentary  (retentionalist) 
experiences makes the central distinction in the inquiry that I wish to pursue: namely, 
the question of the relationship between the temporal structure of experience and the 
temporal structure of its objects. For example, one could hold a view on which an 
experience is momentary  with an extended content (Dainton’s ‘retentionalism’) without 
holding that retention is the cognitive faculty making this picture possible; furthermore, 
one could hold to a view on which an experience is not momentary, but just not 
extended to the same extend as its content (e.g. Lee 2014a). As we have seen, something 
about the relation between our two temporal structures can be drawn from Dainton’s 
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two positions; extensionalism would most naturally  include the thesis that the temporal 
structures match, whilst retentionalism would most naturally come together with the 
view that  the temporal structures can and do diverge. However, this is not the whole 
story: I would like to instead investigate the notion of ‘temporal matching’ or 
‘mirroring’ further, what it involves, and what sort of conception of experience arises 
from it. To this end, I will now outline the debate in different terms: there is 
disagreement in the literature concerning the extent to which a ‘mirroring’ constraint on 
temporal experience is upheld. I will also consider the notion of ‘inheritance’, which is 
found in Phillips (2009) and Soteriou (2013), and which is taken to be a development of 
the mirroring thesis. After setting up the debate as framed around the mirroring thesis, I 
present some challenges to the mirroring these in chapters 3 and 4. In the concluding 
chapter 5, I return to a specific view of experience that a denial of mirroring might 
suggest (something akin to Dainton’s retentionalism, albeit without  specific reliance on 
the notion of retention), and consider some of its weaknesses.
Mirroring
A temporal structure is a collection of entities ordered by temporal relations, and 
possessing temporal properties. We experience the world as having a temporal structure, 
in the sense that we are aware of successions of events which have duration, and objects 
that change over time. However, it is also intuitively plausible that our experiences 
themselves have their own temporal structure; experiences succeed one another in time, 
change, and have duration as well. In this essay, I am concerned with these two 
temporal structures and the relation between them: the temporal order and durations of 
objects experienced, and the temporal order and durations of the experiences 
themselves. We generally  take both experiences and their objects to have temporal 
structures; and so one view open to us is to hold that these temporal structures mirror, or 
match, each other. The basic ‘mirroring’ principle can thus be articulated as follows:
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Mirroring - For a temporal property  T, if the objects of an experience [for our purposes, 
events] instantiate T, then the experience itself instantiates T.
Lee (2014a) describes mirroring in less formal terms, as the view that ‘the way an 
experience of a melody [for example] unfolds over time mirrors the way the melody 
itself unfolds over time’ (p.1). What this means in practice is that if the object of an 
experience has a given temporal property, then the experience itself has the same 
temporal property. Of course, the mirroring principle as presented here is too imprecise 
to analyze: which temporal properties satisfy  mirroring, and how fine-grained we are to 
take the principle is left  open. As mentioned earlier, the mirroring principle cannot be 
true of all properties loosely characterized as ‘temporal properties’, since this would 
include motion, and experiences are not plausibly  thought to move around like physical 
objects. The mirroring principle can only be considered properly if it is decided which 
temporal properties satisfy it. As stated previously, I will take the temporal properties in 
question to be duration and succession (ordering); I will assume that these are two 
viable candidates that could satisfy  the principle. Typically, mirroring theorists (for 
example, Phillips (2010, 2014a)) hold that at least these two key temporal properties 
satisfy the mirroring principle.
With this in mind, we can consider three different readings of the principle. Lee 
articulates these three readings as follows:
Metrical Mirroring: the ordering and duration relations between the temporal parts of a 
process-experience match those of the apparent perceived scene. 
Topological Mirroring: only the ordering relations between the temporal parts of a 
process-experience match those of the apparent perceived scene. 
Structural Mirroring: only distinct temporal stages of the perceived scene are presented 
by distinct temporal stages of experience. 
         (Lee 2014a, p.9)
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In his treatment of mirroring, Lee reads the mirroring constraint as only  being an option 
for what he calls ‘process’ views of experience: views that hold that experiences are 
extended processes that unfold alongside their objects. This specific view needn’t 
concern us at this point, though we can note that Dainton’s ‘extensionalist’ would most 
naturally  be drawn to such a view. We might read these three interpretations of the 
mirroring principle as varying from strong to weak respectively. Metrical mirroring 
states that both the ordering and duration relations of an experience match those of the 
perceived scene1. For example, if I have an experience of three notes in quick 
succession, A, B and C#, then that  experience will have three parts that correspond to A, 
B and C#, which occur in that order. Furthermore, if the duration of A is 0.5 seconds 
(say), then the duration of the experience of A will also last 0.5 seconds. As Lee puts it, 
‘an experience of a 1 second gap between two sounds is mirrored by a 1 second gap 
between the experiences of the sounds themselves’ (Lee 2014a p.9). This is the strongest 
mirroring constraint one might endorse with regard to the properties of duration and 
succession: both temporal properties are mirrored by the experience itself. In the case of 
topological mirroring, only  the temporal property of succession is mirrored: the 
ordering of the respective experiences is fixed by the ordering of A, B and C#, but the 
individual experiences of these notes need not have the same duration as the notes 
themselves. And in the case of structural mirroring, the weakest reading of the 
principle, it is only the general temporal structure of the perceived scene that is mirrored 
with regard to the experiences themselves; on this reading, the experience of A, B and 
C# might have three parts corresponding to the three notes, but might not necessarily 
occur in this order.
It is easy  to see how the mirroring principle might  be attractive to an ‘extensionalist’ in 
Dainton’s terminology. Recall that the extensionalist’s two main commitments were to 
experience being extended, and experiences decomposing into parts that are also 
experiences. The strongest interpretation of mirroring, metrical mirroring, seems to 
entail these two commitments: for an experience to mirror the successive structure of A, 
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1 Phillips uses ‘apparent object’, in order to account for cases of hallucination and illusion where the 
experience may be of something other than a genuine physical object or event.
B and C#, it  must have parts that correspond to these notes that are also experiences, 
and for an experience to mirror the duration the duration of a note, it must itself have 
duration, i.e. be extended in time. It is less clear that topological mirroring  or structural 
mirroring entail the extensionalist thesis explicitly, but Lee holds that each of the three 
mirroring constraints imply a ‘process’ view of experience; and since the most natural 
way to hold experience to be extended is to hold that  experiences are processes, 
extended in time, we might agree with Lee on this point. If one subscribes to a 
mirroring constraint on temporal experience, whatever its strength, then the most natural 
view to take regarding experience itself is, in Dainton’s terminology, ‘extensionalism.’ 
Dainton himself subscribes to this position in Dainton (2000, 2010a). In the course of 
this essay, I will advocate the denial of at least  the metrical and topological mirroring 
principles previously outlined, in the case of temporal experience.
Mirroring, resemblance and inheritance
If it is accepted that any of the mirroring constraints above, or interpretations of the 
mirroring principle, are genuine constraints on temporal experience, one question that 
naturally  arises is the question of why should such a mirroring constraint hold? It would 
surely not be a mere coincidence that the two temporal structures that we are 
considering should be systematically  related in this manner with regard to duration and 
succession: what explains the relation? Does one temporal structure depend for its 
nature on the other, and if so, which way does the dependence run, and what is the 
nature of the dependence relation? Lee considers one possible explanation of mirroring 
(though does not endorse it): what he calls ‘representation by resemblance.’ If such a 
resemblance theory of experience is true, then ‘experiences present certain kinds of 
temporal features partly by themselves having the very same features’ (Lee 2014a p.10). 
On this view, experiences are able to present / represent certain temporal properties 
partly by having those very same temporal properties: the specific temporal properties 
that satisfy  this theory (duration, succession, or both) depending on the particular 
mirroring constraint  endorsed. In this proposed explanation of mirroring, the content of 
experiences depends at least  in part on the nature of the experience itself: the temporal 
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structure of the experience is metaphysically prior to the temporal structure of its 
objects. An explanation is thus given of why a given experience has a given content: it 
is the temporal structure of the experience itself that explains the temporal structure of 
its content. As Lee states (p.11), the representation by  resemblance view does not 
violate ‘James’ dictum’, mentioned earlier, which is that experience having a certain 
temporal property (i.e. succession) is not sufficient for that property to be represented in 
experience. Rather, succession of experience is necessary  but non-sufficient for 
experience of succession; other constraints will bear on whether experience is able to 
(re)present succession, including (perhaps) the proximity of experiences in time, and 
whether such experiences are unified in the right way over time. On the resemblance 
picture, the temporal structure of experience is explanatorily prior to the temporal 
structure of the objects, and so an explanation is given for their mirroring: the temporal 
structure of the objects of experience matches the temporal structure of experience itself 
owing in part to this representation by resemblance.
An alternative picture of why mirroring might be the case is suggested by  Soteriou in 
The Mind’s Construction (Soteriou 2013). Motivated by a relational ‘naive realist’ view 
of experience, on which the character of perception is (partly) constituted by the objects 
of the perceived scene, Soteriou sees the dependence relation hold in the opposite 
direction. On the relational view, which is often contrasted with ‘representationalist’ 
views, a special perceptual relation is present between a subject and his/her objects of 
perception in cases of true perceptual contact with the world. When we genuinely 
perceive an object or event, the object or event partly constitutes the experience itself. 
This is not  the case in cases of hallucination, where we appear to be in genuine 
perceptual contact with an object or event, but in fact the object or event  does not exist. 
In these cases, the perceptual relation does not hold, despite the fact that the scene might 
appear to the subject to be qualitatively identical. Cases of genuine perception are 
therefore metaphysically distinct from cases of mere hallucination in terms of the sort  of 
experience enjoyed: genuine perceptual experiences and hallucinations are experiences 
of fundamentally  different  kinds. The representationalist  disagrees, positing a difference 
between ‘veridical’ and ‘non-veridical’ perception; cases of genuine perception and 
36
hallucination are fundamentally the same kind of experience, except that in cases of 
hallucination, the perception is non-veridical, or false. Soteriou subscribes to a 
‘process’ view of experience which, as we have seen, is extensionalist  according to 
Dainton; on this view, experiences are extended processes which unfold alongside their 
objects. Given the relational picture Soteriou also subscribes to, his explanation for the 
mirroring constraint is that the temporal structure of the experience depends on the 
temporal structure of its objects; the object (in this case, an event) perceived constitutes 
perception in such a way that  the temporal structure of experience mirrors the temporal 
structure of the event perceived. Whilst  Lee’s ‘representation by resemblance’ had the 
temporal structure of the events (in the veridical case) dependent on the temporal 
structure of the experience, Soteriou sees the dependence going the other way: the 
temporal structure of experience depends on the temporal structure of the events 
perceived, in the case of genuine perception. The explanation for why mirroring holds 
on Soteriou’s account is that, on the relational view, the objects of perception partly 
constitute experience itself, and this is the basis for the latter to gain its temporal 
structure from the former.
We might refer to the pictures Lee and Soteriou present with regard to the explanation 
of temporal mirroring as presenting ways in which one entity ‘inherits’ the properties of 
the other. In Lee’s case, the objects of experience inherit their temporal structure from 
experiences themselves, whilst in Soteriou’s case, experience inherits its temporal 
structure from its objects. The language of ‘inheritance’ when it comes to temporal 
properties is used most prominently by Phillips (2014a) in describing the relation 
between our two temporal structures. However, and as Lee (2014a) notes, Phillips uses 
the language of inheritance simply to advocate a mirroring constraint on temporal 
experience, and doesn’t intend his account to provide an explanation for why mirroring 
is true. Therefore, whilst we might interpret  an ‘inheritance’ claim as suggestive of a 
metaphysical dependency  relation, as in the case of Soteriou, in Phillips the term is 
simply  a metaphor for the existence of a mirroring constraint, plus a certain thesis 
concerning order of explanation. Phillips’ presentation of inheritance is dominated by 
the claim that 
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‘...for any temporal property apparently presented in perceptual experience, 
experience itself has that same temporal property’ (Phillips 2014a, abstract); 
in other words, a mirroring thesis. Rather than explicitly adding to the mirroring thesis a 
claim about the metaphysical dependence of one set of properties on the other, Phillips 
simply  discusses the mirroring thesis in the language of inheritance, suggesting that 
inheritance in his account is simply a metaphor that denotes a general matching of 
temporal structures: ‘our stream of consciousness inherits the temporal structure of the 
events which are its contents’ (Phillips 2014a p.6). Since Phillips’ presentation of 
mirroring is the account which I will be paying most critical attention in this essay, it is 
worth getting clear on a couple of preliminary  questions concerning Philips’ conception 
of mirroring and inheritance, with reference to the quote from Phillips 2014a, above. 
Firstly, it is a crucial question as to what kind of mirroring constraint Phillips has in 
mind when advocating mirroring by way of the metaphor of inheritance. Something 
stronger than merely structural mirroring is intended: if ‘any property apparently 
presented in perceptual experience’ is mirrored for experience itself, then this is a claim 
not simply about experience-phases, but about duration and ordering/succession, since 
as we have seen, these are both properties that  can be said to feature in immediate 
experience. This observation alone is suggestive of the strongest mirroring constraint, 
metrical mirroring, on which both ordering and duration relations are mirrored in 
experience. However, when Phillips makes an argument for the mirroring/inheritance 
claim explicitly (Phillips 2010), his focus is solely  on the temporal property of 
succession: a  key premise in his argument (which will be the main focus of the next 
chapter) is that ‘we will always rationally judge an experience of succession to be itself 
successive in temporal structure...’ (Phillips 2010 p.183). It is unclear whether Phillips 
intends his argument to apply only  to the temporal property of succession, or whether 
this is simply an example property used to demonstrate the conclusion of the argument, 
which concerns any temporal property found in experience. For the purposes of this 
essay, I take Phillips to be advocating a metrical mirroring constraint, and this is the 
mirroring constraint I will seek to cast doubt on later on. I take it as read that when 
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Phillips states that ‘for any temporal property apparently presented in experience...’ the 
class of temporal properties is restricted; motion, for example, is a temporal property  on 
one reading, but is never plausibly had by experiences themselves. Quibbles about the 
class of ‘temporal properties’ aside, I assume here that Phillips’ claim should be 
restricted to duration and succession only, since these are properties which at least are 
candidates for being had by experience themselves, when we reflect on our own 
experience.
Secondly, we can question Phillips’ formulation of the mirroring thesis above by noting 
the distinction between properties of objects/events and apparent properties of objects/
events. Like Lee (2014a), Phillips formulates the notion of mirroring/inheritance as 
holding between apparent objects events and experiences, rather than the objects/events 
themselves. This is intended to allow for cases of hallucination, where what is presented 
in experience is (seemingly) qualitatively identical to a real object or event, but no such 
object or event exists. On a relationalist account such as Soteriou’s where the 
inheritance relation is read in a ‘metaphysical dependence’ sense, and where the contrast 
between hallucination and genuine perception is crucial for the nature of the experience 
itself, the contrast is not necessary: since in genuine perception the real objects partly 
constitute the perceptual experience itself, mirroring will only hold in cases of genuine 
perception. For Phillips, introducing the ‘apparent’ clause allows neutrality on the 
perceptual question: representationalism vs a naive realist/relationalist  account. There is 
certainly a question here of how the properties of an experience are supposed to depend 
on properties of apparent objects; since apparent properties depend on experiences 
themselves (to be ‘apparent’ is just to feature in experience), there seems to be 
something circular in claiming that the properties of experiences themselves depend on 
apparent properties or objects, which themselves depend on experiences. The point 
would be more acute if Phillips advocated inheritance as a thesis of metaphysical 
dependence: merely apparent properties do not seem to be the sort of entities on which 
the nature of experience could depend in this manner.  However, as we have seen, we 
should think of inheritance in Phillips as used merely as a metaphor by which to 
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advocate a mirroring constraint. For the purposes of this essay, we may bracket worries 
about apparent vs real properties, and cases of hallucination; restricting the mirroring/
inheritance thesis to veridical cases (cases of genuine perception, where properties of 
real objects are (re)presented) will be sufficient for my critique of mirroring.
Having set out these preliminaries, the main purpose of this essay is to cast doubt on the 
view that experience either metrically or topologically mirrors its objects in terms of 
temporal structure; to this end, I will in the next chapter discuss a major argument from 
Phillips for mirroring, which I will give reasons to reject. The key form of my argument 
in the next two chapters is as follows. Metrical mirroring entails that if I experience a 
note A then a note B, then my experience of A must precede my experience of B in time 
(owing to the inheritance of ordering relations between the objects of experience); and 
furthermore, if A is experienced as being of a certain duration, the experience of A itself 
must have the same duration. Topological mirroring entails only the first of these two 
claims, the claim concerning succession. However, there may  be cases whose most 
natural interpretation suggests that A and then B can be experienced without the 
corresponding experiences possessing that order, or cases where A is experienced as 
having some duration, but the corresponding experience lacks this duration. If such 
cases can be substantiated, then this is a reason to doubt that either metrical or 
topological mirroring is the case with regard to temporal experience.
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3. Mirroring and transparency
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I set out the closely related notions of ‘mirroring’ and 
‘inheritance’ proposed by  some theorists as constraints on temporal experience, as a 
means of accounting for some features of our experience of temporal properties. I 
observed that whilst what sometimes characterizes the ‘inheritance’ thesis is a claim 
about dependency (namely, that the temporal properties of an experience depend for 
their explanation in some way on the temporal properties (re)presented in that 
experience), all readings of the inheritance thesis entail that there is a ‘mirroring’ 
constraint on temporal experience. That is, if inheritance is true, the temporal structure 
of an experience must mirror or match the temporal structure of that which is 
(re)presented in experience, at least with regard to the key temporal properties of 
duration and succession. As stated previously, though inheritance is a dependency 
relation, and therefore asymmetric, it entails a matching of two temporal structures, and 
it is this matching I shall be focussing on in this chapter. That the two temporal 
structures under investigation match in this manner is the conclusion of an argument 
made by Phillips (2010) from observations concerning the so-called transparency of 
experience. In this chapter, I present a number of challenges to this argument, which if 
reasonable provide a reason to reject that such mirroring or matching is a constraint on 
our temporal experience; a prominent argument for the mirroring view can be rejected. 
If we reject the claim that experience temporally mirrors its objects in the temporal case, 
then this entails that the inheritance thesis is false, since inheritance entails a mirroring 
constraint. Phillips restricts his argument to  the temporal property  of succession; I take 
my rejection of this argument to provide good reason to doubt that experience mirrors 
its (apparent) objects with regard to succession. Having made this negative case, I go on 
in chapter 4 to present a further argument against the mirroring view, this time 
concerning the duration of experience.
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Phillips’ argument from transparency
I will begin by presenting the argument as Phillips presents it in Phillips (2010); I then 
present what I take to be a clearer reconstruction of the argument presented in Frischhut 
(2014). Phillips presents the argument as an argument against the view that we can 
experience temporal intervals at a moment, and furthermore that the argument 
demonstrates that this view is ‘revealed to be impossible when we reflect on the nature 
of our experience’ (Phillips 2010 p.183). However, the argument is also an argument for 
the matching of two temporal structures, and so presents a challenge to any view that 
denies this claim, including views (such as the view I advocate later with Lee 2014a) 
that deny that experiences are momentary  or durationless, but that nevertheless hold that 
the two temporal structures in question can diverge. The argument is intended by 
Phillips not  to show that such divergence (i.e. a rejection of temporal mirroring) is not 
theoretically impossible or contradictory, but  that it is not consistent with manifest  facts 
revealed when we reflect on the nature of our experience.
- ‘When one attends to the temporal structure of experience (that is: reflects upon 
its nature...it is rational to judge that one’s experience is temporally 
determined....only by taking its temporal structure to mirror the apparent 
temporal structure of the world experienced, i.e by making a judgement 
concerning the apparent temporal structure of the world experienced, and then 
taking the experience to have that same temporal structure.’
- ‘Thus, we will always rationally judge an experience of succession [for 
example] to be itself successive in temporal structure as opposed to 
instantaneous.’
- ‘Experience cannot systematically seem some way to rational introspective 
reflection and yet be some other way.’
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- Therefore, ‘we cannot be systematically in error when we judge our experiences 
of succession to themselves be successive in temporal structure [for example] as 
opposed to instantaneous.’
         (Phillips 2010 p.183)
Here Phillips focusses solely  on the temporal property of succession in this formulation 
of the argument, though I take it that  it  is at least a possibility that the reasoning applies 
to the property of  duration as well. Whilst Phillips’ formulation of the reasoning from 
the so-called transparency of experience to the conclusion that experience temporally 
mirrors its objects is clear enough, there are many notions appealed to in the argument 
that call out for further explanation and elucidation. To fully  asses the argument, we 
require better notions of ‘transparency’, ‘introspection’, ‘rational judgment’ and 
‘seeming’; and as I will later argue, the argument can be challenged once we get clearer 
of how these concepts are being used and the role they  play in the argument. 
Furthermore, Phillips’ own presentation of the reasoning is casual in nature; his 
presentation does not fit  the form of a tight, clear argument. I will therefore follow 
Frischhut (2014) in reconstructing the argument in a tighter form, in order to make clear 
the various claims on which each stage of the argument relies.
1) Transparency: when we attend to our experiences, we are attending to, at  least in 
part, the objects of those experiences; we have indirect introspective access to the 
temporal structure of our experiences through perceiving the temporal structure of 
their objects.
2) Rational judgment: we will always rationally judge an experience of e.g. 
succession, to be successive in temporal structure as opposed to instantaneous. It  is 
always rational to judge as such.
3) Judging -> seeming: If S judges that experience is a certain way based on rational 
introspection, then it seems to S that experience is that way.
4) Therefore, it always seems as if our own experiences mirror the temporal properties 
of their objects.
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5) Seems -> Is: if it seems to S that their experience is a certain way based on rational 
introspection, then S’s experience has that nature; seeming is a good guide to the 
nature of experience.
6) Conclusion: Therefore, experience has the same temporal structure as its objects.
                  (from Frischhut 2014)
The conclusion of the reconstructed argument as I have construed it is that some form of 
mirroring is the case, to say nothing further of the relationship  between the two sets of 
temporal properties. In Phillips’ original statement of the argument above, reference is 
made to the determination of the temporal structure of experience by the temporal 
structure of the world; however, the inheritance claim implicit  here is not strictly 
necessary  to establish the conclusion that Phillips wants, which is that an experience 
cannot be momentary whilst apprehending a temporal spread of content. In arguing for 
the conclusion that the two temporal structures must  match, Phillips wishes to rule out 
the possibility  of the divergence of the two temporal structures. Therefore, I will treat 
the above argument as an argument for mirroring, rather than inheritance; whether the 
claim concerning explanatory dependence investigated in the previous chapter holds in 
addition to the mirroring claim is not at stake here. None of the observations crucial to 
the argument rely on this additional specification of the direction of the dependence of 
one temporal structure on the other.
Analysis of Phillips’ argument
Premise 1, ‘transparency’ consists of an observation made frequently in the philosophy 
of perception concerning the content of introspection. The central observation is that 
when we turn our mind’s eye inward in introspection, towards experiences themselves, 
we encounter only the objects of experience: ‘external’ properties and relations rather 
than intrinsic properties of the experience itself. Metaphorically speaking, experience is 
‘transparent’ because none of its properties are given in introspection: we see right 
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through it, and apprehend properties of the objects of experience instead. As Harman 
puts it:
“When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all 
experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are 
experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience 
any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experiences ... Look at a 
tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual 
experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your 
attention to will be features of the presented tree”. (Harman 1999, p.251).
Here, Harman construes transparency  as evidenced by our inability to pick out any 
intrinsic features of experience when we introspect: when we describe a certain 
experience, for example of a red tomato, we will inevitably  use words such as ‘red’ and 
‘round’ to describe the experience despite the fact that these are properties not of the 
experience itself, but of the object of the experience. If there are intrinsic features of 
experience (such as qualia etc), we cannot apprehend them or learn about them via 
introspection. Martin describes the notion in a similar manner:
“...introspection of one’s perceptual experiences reveals only mind-
independent objects, qualities and relations that one learns about through 
perception.” (Martin 2002 p. 378)
As with Harman, the passage from Martin suggests transparency as a largely negative 
thesis concerning what we are able to apprehend via the process of introspection: it  is 
only mind-independent properties we can apprehend, since we are not able to specify 
any intrinsic features of the experience itself. Based on this construal, we might take 
transparency considerations to highlight  an important constraint on our ability to come 
to know facts about our own experience; whilst we might think of our own experiences 
as immediately and intimately knowable, a moment’s reflection tells us that we cannot 
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pick out any  of their intrinsic features by simply turning our attention towards them. 
What is revealed by this process are external properties and relations. Transparency 
construed in this way can be seen as a negative claim, since it entails that we cannot 
apprehend ‘internal’ properties (i.e. properties of our experience itself) that are distinct 
from the properties of the external object/event we are experiencing.
The manner in which Phillips presents the transparency  claim, however, can be seen as 
a development of the conception of transparency advocated by the theorists quoted 
above. Whilst acknowledging that introspection acquaints us directly  only with external 
properties and relations, Phillips supplements this thesis with a further claim that is 
crucial to his argument: that we can nevertheless have indirect access to some of the 
properties of our experiences (i.e. an experience’s temporal properties) through 
introspection, at least in the temporal case (Frischhut 2014). In explicitly  introducing a 
contrast between direct and indirect perception, Phillips concurs with Harman and 
Martin that our introspection is restricted in a significant sense to external properties 
and relations of objects, but supplements the negative thesis with a further claim about 
experiential access. For Phillips, despite the fact that when we attempt to describe our 
experiences we find ourselves attending to / describing properties of the objects of those 
experiences, we nevertheless have a kind of indirect access to the temporal structure of 
our experiences through perceptually attending to the temporal structure of their objects. 
This represents a positive thesis, and a somewhat weaker interpretation of the original 
transparency observation. Whilst the manner in which Harman and Martin present 
transparency is largely negative, Phillips explicitly makes the claim that the act of 
introspection, or rational reflection on one’s own experience, does reveal something 
about experience; its temporal structure, albeit indirectly via apprehension of the 
temporal structure of the objects of the experience:
‘...when we set out to describe our experience itself, we find ourselves 
doing so, at least partly, by attending to its objects.’ (Phillips 2014a p.
132).
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The positive formulation of the transparency claim is taken by  Phillips to simply follow 
from reflection on our own experience, rather than from any theoretical considerations 
about perception. However, premise 1 is also implicitly committed to a ‘uniqueness’ 
claim concerning the perception of temporal properties; that the kind of indirect access 
to experience required for premise 1 only holds in the temporal case. Recall the well-
worn observation made earlier that it doesn’t  seem as if experience has a colour or 
spatial structure, but it does seem that experience has a real temporal structure. The 
transparency claim in premise 1 presupposes that temporal properties are unique in this 
regard, since in the spatial and colour cases, experience simply has no such properties to 
be indirectly apprehended on introspection (or so we might think). Phillips does not 
want to hold that experiences are spatially  transparent, for example, since he takes it  to 
be implausible that experience has any spatial properties at all that are indirectly 
acquainted with on introspection. Considered in isolation, this uniqueness claim is 
plausible, however it  is important to consider it as it  will play a key role in the criticism 
of some of the other premises of Phillips’ argument. Premise 2, concerning ‘rational 
judgement’, is taken by Phillips to simply follow from premise 1, given a couple of 
background assumptions concerning our ability to determine the temporal structure of 
our own experiences. 
More interesting, and controversial, are the next steps in the argument, from the claim 
concerning rational judgment to the conclusion concerning not our judgment of 
experience, but the nature of experience itself. Having established via transparency that 
we can determine the temporal structure of our experiences indirectly by taking it  to 
match or mirror the temporal structure of the objects of experience, and that  we make 
rational judgments concerning experience on this basis, Phillips introduces the notion of 
‘seeming’. For Phillips, judging that x (where x is a fact about our own experience) 
entails seeming that x; that is, if S judges that x, then it seems to S that x. Premises 2 
and 3 jointly entail that it  always seems to us as if the previously  mentioned mirroring 
constraint on temporal experience holds; that is, we can determine the temporal 
structure of experience only  by taking it to mirror the temporal structure of the objects 
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of experience. Premise 5 states that we are not systematically deceived when it comes to 
experience; if experience seems a certain way to us, then it really  is this way; 
introspection is ‘infallible’ when it comes to the nature of experience (Lee 2014c). The 
conclusion, that the temporal structure of experience and the temporal structure of its 
objects must match, follows.
Different views on access
I will now consider ways the argument might be challenged, and rejected. Lee (2014c) 
notably challenges the 1st, and by extension 2nd, premise. In his critique, Lee 
formulates two claims contained within Phillips’ premise 1: the ‘transparency’ premise 
that introspection only reveals external properties and relations, and the ‘reflection’ 
premise that we can nevertheless apprehend the temporal features of experience via 
apprehending the properties of their objects in introspection (Lee 2014c p.156). I take 
this distinction to be the same as I made above, consisting of the negative thesis that we 
cannot directly  apprehend ‘inner’ properties in introspection, but we can indirectly 
encounter them, though apprehending the (temporal) properties of their objects. In 
critiquing the transparency  premise, we could either deny that we have any introspective 
access to the temporal features of our experience at all, or we could reject the claim that 
introspection is transparent in the sense that the only access we have to the temporal 
features of experience is through reflection on their objects. I formulate these two 
options as follows:
- No access: we have no access to the temporal structure of our experience.
- Other access: we have access to the temporal structure of our experience that does not 
depend on apprehending the properties of its objects.
Note that both these claims are ways of rejecting premise 1 of the argument, and thus 
premise 2 by extension. The ‘no access’ claim constitutes a rejection of a presumption 
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in the transparency premise: that we can, in fact, determine the temporal structure of our 
own experiences. The ‘other access’ claim is more a straightforward denial that  there is 
a transparency constraint on our temporal experience. Are these claims plausible, and 
how might they be substantiated?
It would be a neat and satisfactory way of rejecting Phillips’ argument for the advocate 
of divergence to simply  deny that  we have any access to the temporal structure of 
experience at all; there would be no need to engage with the details of the argument, 
which could just be rejected as containing a false presupposition about experience. A 
spatial analogy might be pushed here: just as we have no introspective access to the 
spatial properties of experience (if there are any), why not too with time? This line of 
thought would also constitute an explicit denial of the ‘uniqueness’ assumption that I 
mentioned earlier, and for some might be too radical a denial of what is generally  taken 
to be an obvious fact about  experience: that experiences change, succeed each other etc 
in time. Faced with a view on which we have no access in this manner, a supporter of 
Phillips’ argument could just make a ‘Moorean’ assertion that this view is obviously 
false: commonsense notions of the stream of consciousness, the unity  of consciousness 
over time, and the continuity of conscious experience presuppose that the basic ‘no 
access’ view is false. 
However, a more promising line can be taken on this point when we consider a weaker 
‘no access’ view: a view that holds that we have no access to the boundaries between 
experiences (Frischhut 2014), and thus no access to the duration of experience. On most 
views party  to the debate about temporal properties, the basic picture is one on which 
individual experiences are unified over time to form the stream of consciousness 
(Dainton 2010a); the manner in which they  are unified is the matter of some debate. The 
unity  of experience over time (‘diachronic unity’) is generally  taken to be necessitated 
by the fact that our conscious experience seems seamless and continuous; or rather, the 
seamless nature of the stream of consciousness, within which experiences seem to flow 
one into the other, is seen by many theorists to indicate that experiences are 
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diachronically  unified. Reflection on what this unity consists in points to an alternative, 
restricted interpretation of ‘no access’ that would serve as a more plausible rejection of 
Phillips’ premise 1 in the argument. To see this, we need only note that  if experiences 
are unified to form the stream of consciousness, we are not aware in our experience of 
the joins, or ‘boundaries’ between each experience. As Frischhut states, this is just what 
the apparent continuity of conscious experience may consist in; an inability to 
phenomenally individuate experiences when we introspect (Frischhut 2014 p.53-54). 
For James (1890), the subjective continuity  of experience consisted in experiences 
‘being without breach, crack or division’ (p.237): as Dainton (2010a) elucidates, ‘a 
succession of stream-phases belonging to S could be said to be continuous if S is 
incapable of discerning any gaps between them’ (section 3). However, once this 
observation is on the table, an obvious question is the question as to how we are able to 
have access to the duration of experience if we have no introspective access to the 
boundaries between experiences. Though it seems as if we represent the temporal 
property  of duration in experience in the sense that when we hear a long note, for 
example, we can hear something of the duration of the note itself, it is hard to see how 
the duration of any particular experience could be specified based on introspection 
without first  specifying when the experience begins and ends. Specification of the 
beginning and the end of an experience would seem to naturally  require apprehension of 
the boundaries of the experience, but as we have seen we have no access to these 
boundaries in introspection. If this reasoning is correct, and we have no introspective 
access to the duration of experience, then premise 1 of the argument fails, since we have 
given an example of a temporal property that doesn’t abide by  Phillips’ transparency 
premise. Whilst not being a decisive criticism of the argument, this reasoning if sound 
places the burden on the supporter of the argument to specify exactly  how we have 
access to the duration of an experience given that we cannot discern its boundaries. And 
if it is conceded that we don’t in fact have introspective access to the duration of an 
experience, then a non-arbitrary reason must be given for why the transparency  premise 
does not apply to this temporal property, but does apply to others, such as succession.
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There is of course an ambiguity in the notion of ‘access to duration’ that is being 
employed in the above argument. It  is one thing to apprehend the property of duration 
with regard to experience; that is, seeming to one that one’s experience has duration. 
However, it is another thing to have access to the specific duration of one’s experience; 
that is, seeming to one that one’s experience lasted, say, 2 seconds. It is plausibly  only 
the second reading of duration access that requires access to the boundaries between 
experiences; it  is hard to see how we could specify the length of an experience in 
seconds without being able to specify  when that experience begins and ends (i.e, where 
its boundaries are). However, having access to the fact  that our experiences have some 
duration does not seem to be precluded by the fact that we have no access to the 
boundaries of experience: it  seems possible that one could discern that  an entity has 
duration or extension in time without being able to discern how much duration or 
extension the entity has. For this reason, we might wish to cast doubt on the more 
developed version of the ‘no access’ approach advocated by Frischuut (2014) above, or 
at least call for a better argument to the conclusion that we have no access to the 
temporal structure of our own experiences. 
Sensory deprivation and covert attention shifts
Leading on from this, I will now consider the prospects of rejecting transparency by 
arguing for the possibility of discerning the temporal structure of experience by some 
way other than specifying the temporal structure of its objects: an ‘other access’ 
approach. Specifically, I will consider  two kinds of cases that  suggest that we can have 
access to the temporal properties of experience independently of the temporal properties 
of their objects. Consider first the idea of a sensory deprivation tank. When placed in 
the sensory  deprivation tank, a subject is unable to experience anything by means of the 
senses; she is unable to apprehend any sensory data, with only  her thoughts for 
company. However, in such a case, the subject  might well have access to the pattern of 
her thoughts if she is conscious, and in particular be able to discern an ordering, or 
succession, of thoughts in her stream of consciousness. For example, on waking up  in 
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the tank, she might first think ‘who put me in this tank?’, but then remembering that she 
signed up  for the experiment (whatever it  is), think ‘oh yes, I volunteered to be in here.’ 
In thinking the first thought and then the second, the subject would be aware of a 
succession of  her thoughts; the feeling of one thought succeeding another in time. In 
doing so, she would be apprehending a temporal property: the temporal property of 
succession. However, no sensory stimulus was required in order for the subject to have 
this temporal experience; in fact, no sensory stimulus was present at all. The sensory 
deprivation tank case therefore seems to be an example, (conceivable, possible and 
actual), of how we can be aware of the temporal structure of our own experiences 
without being aware of the temporal structure of worldly objects: a conclusion that is in 
tension with Phillips’ initial transparency  claim. Phillips holds that we can’t help but 
access and describe the temporal structure of experience via the temporal structure of 
worldly objects and events; however, the sensory  deprivation tank case seems to pose a 
situation where we can access and describe the temporal structure of experience without 
having access to or describing the temporal structure of the world.
The sensory  deprivation tank case prompts reflection on the kind of experience we have 
of our own stream of consciousness, whether being aware of a succession of thoughts is 
enough to be properly  experiencing succession as I have currently construed it  (as an 
immediate presentation or representation similar to when we experience colour in the 
visual case), and what notion of transparency is required in order for Phillips’ claim to 
stand. In his account, Phillips (2010) is not at  all clear what kind of transparency thesis 
he wishes to uphold, and more specifically, whether transparency is intended to be 
restricted to the sensory case, as opposed to the general experiential case. If Phillips’ 
transparency point (that ‘when we set out to describe our experience itself, we find 
ourselves doing so, at least partly, by attending to its objects’) is unrestricted and so 
applies to non-perceptual experience such as that had by the subject in the sensory 
deprivation tank, then it seems that  the case provides a straightforward counterexample 
to transparency, and so Phillips’ argument can be rejected. However, we might also 
consider the possibility that Phillips wishes to restrict his transparency claim to the case 
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of sensory perception; that  is, sensory perceptual experience is transparent in the 
manner specified, to say nothing of other kinds of perceptual experiences which are not 
sensory  by nature. Much of what Phillips says elsewhere in his work suggests this 
restriction, especially considering the close analogue focussed on between temporal and 
spatial perception, at  least when considering the immediateness of the perception of 
temporal properties with other non-temporal properties. If we grant the restriction of the 
transparency premise to sensory  perception, then the sensory  deprivation tank case 
provides no challenge: it is not a case of sensory perception. However, an alternative 
case is posed by Lee (2014c), who presents a putative case of ‘other access’ that  does 
not involve sensory deprivation, but a genuine case of sensory  perception. In pursuit of 
this strategy, Lee focuses on proposed ‘covert attention shifts’, purported cases where 
we can be aware of our experience changing in a way that is not  tied to or dependent 
upon external changes in the way  that transparency would dictate. Lee gives the 
example of a case where an observer’s visual and auditory  scene is identical, but 
nevertheless where one’s ‘inner’ attention is shifted:
‘Consider shifting your attention from one object to another. These could be 
covert attention shifts that do not require moving your eyes or other body 
parts. And the scene you’re looking at might not be changing at all. Still, 
you experience a change as happening - a psychological change....it is not 
merely that your experience changes when you shift your attention: you 
have an experience of change happening....for example if you shift attention 
back and forth between two objects at a certain rate...you can be aware of 
this rate.‘ [Lee 2014c p.158].
The way in which the possibility of these cases is supposed to challenge transparency  is 
as follows. If the external, worldly  scene we perceive is qualitative identical (in the 
sense that all the same external properties and relations are fixed), but  we can still shift 
our attention to aspects of the scene and be aware of the change involved in the 
attention shift, then we have a proposed counterexample to transparency: a case where 
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we have introspective access to a temporal property of our experience (change or 
succession) which cannot have come via the properties of the worldly  scene we are 
perceiving. The possibility of such covert attention shifts does not simply  come from 
reflection on how we seem to perceive the world, but also from psychological research. 
For example, Hoffman (1998) concludes that ‘eye movements directed to a location in 
space are preceded by a shift of visual attention to the same location‘ (p.119). 
Furthermore, not only do covert attention shifts precede and pay a vital role in eye 
movement, but covert attention can vary whilst the eye position remains fixed (e.g. 
Eriksen and Hoffman 1972). As Hoffman states, ‘The relationship between attention 
and eye movements is one of partial interdependence. Attention is free to move 
independent of the eyes, but eye movements require visual attention to precede them to 
their goal’ (Hoffman 1998 p.120). Such research lends plausibility to the claim that if 
the visual scene is fixed (as well as scenes in other sense modalities), and thus there is 
no change in the external properties perceived, introspective perception of experiential 
properties can vary, leading to apprehension of change and succession without a 
corresponding perceived change in objects of the experience. Though it is not obvious 
how it is that such psychological discernments are made (which theory  of attention we 
go for will be a matter for psychology), all that  is needed to resist Phillips‘ first  premise, 
even when it is restricted in the manner I suggested above, is some evidence for the 
possibility of covert attention shifts.
The two examples presented in response to the transparency claim in Phillips above 
differ as follows. In the sensory deprivation tank case, the subject experiences temporal 
phenomena (the succession of his/her thoughts in the stream of consciousness) in a 
purely  non-sensory way. Such an example can only hold force against the transparency 
point if the transparency point  is intended to apply to non-sensory perception; in 
Phillips’ account, the non-restriction of transparency in this manner is not  made clear. 
Supposing that the transparency point, and therefore the mirroring thesis that it  is 
introduced to support, is intended to be restricted to sensory perception only (i.e. 
experience only temporally mirrors its objects in cases of sensory  perception), the 
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example of covert attention shifts can be introduced as a more compelling 
counterexample to this restricted transparency thesis.
Different kinds of seeming
However, suppose these cases are met  with an adequate response, and the supporter of 
mirroring continues to claim that perceptual experience is transparent; how might we 
critique the argument based on the remaining premises? The crucial claims are 
contained within premises 3 and 5; premise 4 is simply a consequence of premises 2 and 
3. Premise 3 states that rational judgment about experience entails experiential seeming; 
premise 5 states that  we are not systematically deceived when it comes to how our own 
experience seems. I consider now both these premises beginning with premise 5, the 
‘seems->is’ premise. This premise states that seeming is a good guide to the nature of 
experience: if perceptual experience seems a certain way (in a sense to be specified), 
then it really is that way. Lee (2014c) terms this an ‘infallible’ conception of awareness: 
the essential claim to Phillips’ argument is that there is ‘no appearance-reality’ 
distinction for experience (Lee 2014c. p.157). If  our experience seems a certain way to 
us, then it  really  is that way; this claim is consistent with cases of illusion and 
hallucination since it  only  concerns what we find in introspection rather than what is 
actually the case in the world perceived. However, it is hard to conclusively accept  or 
reject this principle without  having a clearer notion of what sense of ‘seeming’ is being 
employed here. I argue, following Frischhut (2014), that each of the two alternative 
readings of ‘seeming’ land the argument in trouble; only one kind of ‘seeming’ makes 
premise 5 plausibly true, yet this reading of ‘seeming’ raises concerns about premise 3. 
Conversely, premise 3 is only made plausible by  interpreting ‘seeming’ in a way that 
brings premise 5 into doubt. 
- Phenomenal seeming: a ‘what-it’s-like’ notion of seeming concerning the qualitative 
aspects of experience, or ‘qualia’. For experience to seem a certain way is for it to 
have a distinctive ‘raw feel’.
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- Cognitive seeming: if it cognitively seems that P, then S endorses P (Frischhut 2014 
p.51). A notion of seeming concerning assenting to certain propositions.
Premise 5, the ‘seems-is’ premise, states that  if experience seems a certain way, then it 
really is that way. This claim is only plausibly true if we take seeming in the 
phenomenal sense; indeed, it is very  hard to see how things could be otherwise on this 
reading. If we conceive of experiences as having to a large degree ‘phenomenal 
character’ as well as representational content, as they are commonly conceived, then 
Phillips’ seems-is premise  is almost trivially true: it is very hard to see how we could 
err about the nature of our experiences on this conception of seeming, given the intimate 
acquaintance with our experience that it  implies. However, if seeming is taken in this 
intuitive sense, then premise 3, the judging-seeming premise, looks to be in doubt. This 
premise states that if S judges that P, then it seems to S that P; however, it is possible to 
conceive of all sorts of situations where a person might judge something about 
experience, but  lack the vital phenomenological component required for this reading of 
‘seeming’. Rational judgement and phenomenal seeming simply appear to be 
independent modes of coming to believe a proposition about an experience. For 
example, I might rationally judge that I’m experiencing a note of 2 seconds, and on that 
basis rationally judge that my experience itself lasts 2 seconds. However, the experience 
might not phenomenally  seem to be 2 seconds long: it might not have any  phenomenal 
component, though it  also might not phenomenally seem to be of a different duration 
(Frischhut 2014 p.50). The phenomenal aspects of experience can appear to come apart 
from rational judgments about experience in a way that is inconsistent with the latter 
entailing the former.
In order to get around this worry, the proponent of Phillips’ argument may wish to 
employ some other notion of seeming: ‘cognitive seeming’. On this reading, if it seems 
to S that P, then this just entails that S is disposed to assent to P, or endorse it. This 
notion lacks the phenomenological component, and as such appears to be a concept 
much closer to rational judgment. Indeed, it is very hard to specify  a situation where 
rationally judging proposition p about experience to be the case does not entail 
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assenting to p; perhaps no case exists. However, once this alternative notion of seeming 
is employed, premise 5 loses its force. Whilst in the case of phenomenal seeming, the 
seems-is claim was plausible, cases can be specified where cognitive seeming that p 
does not entail that p; an appearance-reality distinction can indeed be made with this 
new conception of seeming. We might assent (on the basis of a good argument, perhaps) 
to all sorts of things about  our own experience if they cognitively seem to be the case; 
however, that  they  aren’t in fact  the case is a real possibility. For example, I might be 
convinced by some compelling arguments (e.g. in Chalmers 1996) that property dualism 
is true, and so my experiences involve an irreducibly mental component; however, it is 
also possible that property dualism is false. In this case, various propositions about 
experience are assented to on the basis of cognitive seeming, but this fact alone does not 
entail that those propositions are true of experience. And if the seems-is premise fails, 
then the conclusion that the temporal properties of experience and its objects match 
doesn’t follow.
Conclusion
The above reflections on Phillips’ argument should not be taken to be conclusive 
rejections of the argument for temporal mirroring. With regard to the ‘no access’ and 
‘other access’ rejections of premise 1, possible responses are available to the mirroring 
theorist, who might spell out ways in which we needn’t be able to discern the 
boundaries between experiences in order to discern their duration, or who might deny 
that altering one’s inner attention on a scene is sufficient for the experience of temporal 
properties such as change. Furthermore, it might be disputed that a distinction can be 
made between rational judgment and phenomenal seeming in the manner I have 
suggested above. However, the force of the argument in this chapter is as follows. The 
conclusion Phillips presents for temporal mirroring was put forward as following from 
ordinary  reflections concerning experience; that is, when we reflect on our own 
experience, it turns out that mirroring is true, and therefore the divergence of the 
temporal structures of experience and object  is impossible. I have given several reasons 
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why one might resist  this strong claim, and show how it is far from obvious that mere 
reflection on how experience seems to us can be used to derive metaphysical 
conclusions concerning the nature of experience. If the points made above are good 
ones, then the burden is on the mirroring theorist and supporter of Phillips’ argument to 
clarify notions of introspection and seeming that make the argument’s conclusion 
plausibly follow. Until this is done, he/she who rejects metrical and topological 
mirroring can feel safe that Phillips’ argument does not demonstrate their position to be 
impossible when attending to ordinary experience.
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4. Postdiction cases and temporal experience
Introduction
In chapters 1 and 2, I introduced the terms ‘inheritance’ and ‘mirroring’ in 
characterizing a major response to what I take to be a central question concerning 
temporal experience: what is the relationship between the temporal properties of 
objects, represented in experience, and the temporal properties of experiences 
themselves? Phillips (2009, 2010, 2014a, 2014b) advocates an ‘inheritance’ thesis: the 
view that experiences inherit their temporal structure from their (apparent) objects. In 
Phillips, inheritance is characterized as a claim of asymmetric dependence (of 
experiences on their objects), but also entails what I, following Lee (2014a) termed 
‘mirroring’, which is the claim that the temporal structure of experience must match the 
temporal structure of its (apparent) objects. The central question of this thesis is whether 
‘mirroring’ is a genuine constraint on temporal experience, or alternatively whether the 
temporal structure of experience can diverge from the temporal structure of its objects. 
In chapter 3, I assessed a central argument from Phillips (2010) for the mirroring thesis, 
and argued that  it is unsuccessful; in this chapter, my aim is to develop a more positive 
argument against  metrical and topological mirroring, and for the divergence of the two 
temporal structures under consideration which focusses on some empirical findings 
from neuroscience. I argue that the most natural interpretation of these ‘postdiction’ 
cases is one that implies that  the above forms of mirroring are not genuine constraints 
on temporal experience; I then argue against a possible response from a supporter of 
mirroring that offers a different interpretation of the empirical results.
In the way that I have characterized the debate thus far, ‘inheritance’ entails ‘mirroring’, 
and ‘mirroring’ is false if it  is shown that an experience can lack a temporal property (in 
our case, either duration or succession) whilst that same property is instantiated by its 
(apparent) object. I will here focus on one kind of empirical case that is often 
interpreted as fulfilling this role: the kind of cases that have been termed ‘postdiction’ 
59
cases. After outlining the sort of challenge these cases have been taken to pose for the 
supporter of theories that require ‘mirroring’, I will consider a prominent response to 
this interpretation (Phillips 2014a), and argue that we should reject the response. I grant 
that back-and-forth about disputed empirical counterexamples doesn’t reasonably rule 
out the possibility that inheritance may  be true of temporal properties nonetheless; 
however, I do conclude that the burden remains on the supporter of a mirroring 
constraint on temporal experience to deal with the empirical findings in a more 
convincing manner as a result.
Postdiction cases
The ‘color-phi’ case has been well discussed in recent debates, with Dennett and 
Kinsbourne (1992) taking it  as a central example in motivating their ‘multiple drafts’ 
model of consciousness, a view that has the divergence claim at its very heart. When 
shown two flashing dots, one following another on opposite sides of a screen, it is 
generally  reported that the dots are perceived as moving back and forth between the 
positions where it  was actually depicted; some subjects in various experiments 
concerning color-phi also reported perceiving a gradual colour change from red to green 
and back in the course of this motion. In other words, when confronted with the flashing 
dots, illusory motion and change are represented in our experience. In the ‘cutaneous 
rabbit’ case, subjects were presented with a set of 5 short pulses at the wrist, followed 
by 5 short taps at the mid-forearm, followed by 5 short taps at the elbow (Geldard and 
Sherrick 1972). Though there were only three actual locations which were presented 
with the stimuli, subjects reported perceiving a greater series of evenly spaced taps 
ascending up the arm from wrist to elbow. In other words, illusory succession was 
represented in experience. The two cases are visually represented in the following pair 
of images; A and B, and 1, 2 and 3, represent different times at which each of the 
associated stimuli were administered in each case.
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The pertinent fact about cases of this form is not simply that false presentations, or non-
veridical representations, of temporal properties were induced in subjects; the mirroring 
thesis as described above is perfectly compatible with such cases of illusion. The 
supporter of mirroring may hold that properties (re)presented in experience are mirrored 
by the experience itself, regardless of whether those representations are veridical or not. 
What’s intriguing about both cases is that  the experience of motion in the Color-phi case 
is seemingly  dependent on the experience of the second stimulus (cutaneous rabbit: 
second set of stimuli), despite the fact that the subject reports experiencing motion 
before the second stimulus/set of stimuli are received. The dot does not appear to move 
towards the right from the left  if there is not a second stimulus on the right in the color-
phi case, and there is no illusory rabbit  if only the first set  of pulses are administered in 
the cutaneous rabbit case. The crucial stage of the experience, using the example of the 
color-phi case, is the experience enjoyed by the subject at the flash of the second dot. It 
seems plausible to observe that this is a momentary (or very short) experience, since the 
stimulus (the flashing green dot) is momentary  (or very short). However, what is 
represented in experiencing this stimulus is an extended temporal interval, which must 
be the case due to the perceived motion of the dot, and the fact that  representing 
temporal properties such as motion in experience requires representing a temporal 
interval. In the cutaneous rabbit case, the point is the same: for the subject to represent 
the illusory rabbit hopping up the arm, she must at the point of the sixth stimulus at the 
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mid-forearm represent an interval of time as preceding this stimulus, containing 
representations of the rabbit at  evenly  spaced points on the arm. As with before, the 
experience of this stimulus is instantaneous, yet again represents the temporal property 
of succession and thus a duration of time. These cases seem to suggest that, prima facie, 
the temporal structure of experience can come apart from the temporal structure of its 
objects; that the forms of mirroring we have been considering are false. An 
instantaneous experience does not inherit its temporal structure from its objects if it also 
(re)presents a temporal interval.
Interpreting postdiction cases: Orwellian vs Stalinesque
Phillips (2014a) considers three possible interpretations of the above cases, only one of 
which (he claims) supports the divergence thesis. He first  argues that the presence of an 
alternative interpretation of the empirical data significantly weakens the argument 
against mirroring-based theories, and furthermore that his own distinct view concerning 
how experiences are realized allows us to reconcile the data with temporal mirroring. 
The two main interpretations of the data Phillips describes can be described 
metaphorically as ‘amnesia’ vs ‘blindness’ (Phillips 2014a p.135). On the ‘amnesia’ 
interpretation (e.g. Grush 2007), we experience a static red dot, then we experience a 
static green dot, and following this (through sub-personal neural processing) the brain 
eradicates these experiences, replacing them with a representation of motion. Dennett 
and Kinsbourne (1992) refer to interpretations of this kind as ‘Orwellian’; in Orwell’s 
‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’, the ruling Party  retrospectively modifies past news items in 
order to produce a representation of the truth that suits them better. On the blindness 
interpretation, by  contrast, we do not experience anything before the apparent motion; 
our brain ‘holds off’ until the second stimulus has been detected, and only then is the 
representation produced in conscious experience; the representation is adjusted at the 
sub-personal level before this point. Dennett and Kinsbourne refer to such 
interpretations as ‘Stalinesque’; the brain produces false representations before entering 
in conscious experience, similar to Stalin’s propaganda machine during the Cold War. 
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This interpretation, Phillips contends, is compatible with mirroring, since it allows the 
experience of the motion itself to be extended in time (i.e. possess duration and change) 
at the point of the second stimulus. It could be argued, for example, that the experience 
of motion is is extended, but that the experience is had only  after a delay, due to neural 
processing (Dainton 2010b). 
The matter of which of these interpretations of the data we should choose is to a large 
extent an empirical matter; that is, presumably one of the interpretations is the correct 
one, and we might expect that further work on the issue by neuroscientists could in 
principle yield the answer. However, this does not preclude us saying something useful 
about the relative merits of each interpretation. A central question in interpreting cases 
such as color-phi and cutaneous rabbit is at what point representations are produced in 
the brain; whether representations are produced in conscious experience and then 
‘overwritten’, whether representations are produced pre-consciously  and modified 
before being introduced into conscious experience, or whether representation in 
experience at a time depends constitutively on experiences at later times. Though the 
question should plausibly  be interpreted as a broadly empirical one, we can still note 
that if one of these interpretations entails a view about experience that is philosophically 
or intuitively problematic, then that might be a reason to reasonably reject that view. 
Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992) argue that the question ‘Orwellian or Stalinesque?’ with 
regard to these cases has no answer, since ‘the boundary between perception and 
memory, like most boundaries between categories, is not perfectly sharp’ (p.192). For 
Dennett and Kinsbourne, there need be no true distinction between the two rival 
explanations of how the brain creates the false representations involved in the color-phi 
and cutaneous rabbit cases, since to pose the distinction is to presume that in one case, 
memory revision is involved (post-experiential revision), whereas in the other case, 
modification of the representation is pre-experiential, before the representation is 
committed to memory. The two supposedly rival explanations, in Dennett’s view, seek 
to differ over whether the neural processing of the false representation occurred ‘before 
or after the fact‘ of  actual conscious experience, which (Dennett claims) presupposes a 
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ultimately  misguided ‘Cartesian materialist‘ conception of consciousness. Dennett and 
Kinsbourne’s key contention is that this model, which holds that there is a place in the 
brain ‘where it all comes together‘ in terms of conscious representation such that there 
is an absolute representation ‘in’ actual consciousness at  a time, is false. The Orwellian 
and Stalinesque interpretations of the color-phi and cutaneous rabbit cases are therefore 
interpretations that presuppose a false view of consciousness; thus, the question as to 
which of them is correct  has no meaningful interpretation. To postulate a ‘mythical 
Great Divide’ (p.192) between ‘actual’ consciousness and other cognitive processes 
such as memory is simply misguided according to Dennett, as they presuppose a kind of 
central observer in the brain where neurally produced representations are presented at a 
definitive point in time for subjective judgment. The alternative view provided by 
Dennett and Kinsbourne is a ‘multiple drafts’ model in which neural discriminations are 
distributed in both space and time in the brain. Instead of a single, well-defined stream 
of consciousness which explains exactly when neural representations enter ‘actual’ 
conscious experience, there is simply  a series of constantly revised and updated 
representations in the brain, cognitively  produced. Conscious experience has no real 
phenomenal character that is taken to be conceptually distinct from the representational 
content of experience, in the manner Chalmers (1996) and others suggest. 
It is customary in the literature to dismiss Dennett’s approach to consciousness on the 
basis that it neglects certain obvious and key aspects of our inner mental lives, aspects 
of our conscious experience which are manifestly  the case when we reflect on our 
awareness of the world and its properties. Whilst Dennett’s position is worth 
considering and raises some interesting questions such as to the relationship between 
consciousness and other cognitive processes, I agree with this orthodox rejection. I have 
already argued in chapter 1 that the assumption of unity  of consciousness and the fact 
that we represent temporal properties in consciousness with their associated 
phenomenal ‘feel’ is incompatible with Dennett’s approach, and we should reject it  on 
this basis. Furthermore, we needn’t throw the baby  out with the bathwater in order to 
deal with colour-phi and cutaneous rabbit cases; the Orwellian and Stalinesque 
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distinction is indeed an instructive one if we make the basic phenomenal assumptions 
concerning the unity  and raw feel of conscious experience. I argue that the Orwellian, 
amnesia-based interpretation advocated by  Grush looks more promising than the 
Stalinesque interpretation advocated by Dainton and others. The Orwellian 
interpretation is, it  seems, the most natural interpretation that takes the data at face 
value; it does seem as if we have an instantaneous experience of motion at or shortly 
after the flash of the second dot, and this is manifestly incompatible with mirroring. By 
contrast, the Stalinesque ‘blindness’ interpretation constitutes an ad hoc addition to the 
properties of experience that is poorly  motivated by any other empirical considerations. 
Dainton points out, in support of this interpretation, that since we already know that 
experience necessarily  involves some delay between the stimulus and the time of the 
resulting representation in consciousness, why could this delay not simply be long 
enough to compensate for the sort of perceptual/experiential modification suggested by 
the postdiction cases? ‘Might it not be that our visual systems take some time (perhaps 
80–100 msec) before producing experience in response to a given stimulus? And might 
they not use this time to work out a single coherent version of events before committing 
it to experience?’ (Dainton 2010b). The problem with this response is that it is poorly 
motivated by any independent concerns, and though Dainton cites one scientific paper 
that supports his contention claiming that unless this interpretation can be ruled out, the 
‘extensionalist’ (for these purposes, the supporter of ‘mirroring’) has nothing to fear 
from postdiction cases, this response misses a key methodological point. Rather than 
taking mirroring to be the case and then simply choosing an interpretation of the 
postdiction data to match, we should focus on the data first and note what can be 
inferred about experience based on the best interpretation. And as I argue, Grush’s 
Orwellian interpretation is superior in that it does not involve making the little-
supported empirical claim that experiences are subject to much more delay than has 
commonly been thought.
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A new conception of experience as anhomoeomerous
Putting Dainton’s interpretation to one side, I now address in more detail a better-
motivated and more plausible solution to the problem that is prima facie posed for 
mirroring. Phillips (2009, 2014a) advocates this third response, which is close in 
structure to Dainton’s blindness interpretation in that relies on the notion of an 
experience at a time being logically  dependent on experience at a later time. On this 
view, on which experiences are taken to be ‘anhomoeomerous’ processes, we cannot 
exactly  say what a subject experiences at a specific time without taking into account 
facts about later experience; for example in the color-phi case, whether a second 
stimulus is presented in experience or not. Phillips claims that  this sort of alternative 
view about how experiences are realized by their underlying neural processes allows us 
to preserve mirroring in light of postdiction cases without the need for experiential over-
writing (Grush 2007) or experiential delay (Dainton 2010b).
Like the ‘blindness’ approach of Dainton, this new ‘holistic’ approach of Phillips seeks 
to preserve mirroring in light of the cases, but I hold that it  leads to problematic 
metaphysical commitments about the nature of experience. It is worth spelling Phillips’ 
interpretation out in more detail, beginning with introducing the Aristotelian notion of 
‘homoeomery.’ In Aristotle, we find the now well-worn distinction between ‘things’ and 
stuffs’; in Aristotelian terminology, ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ substances respectively. 
For Aristotle, primary substances were concrete individuals of a particular kind, and 
countable, such as a certain block of gold, or a particular human being (say, ‘Socrates’). 
‘Secondary’ substances are general kinds to which the primary substances, or things, 
belong; for example, ‘gold’ would be the secondary  substance, or ‘stuff’, to which the 
individual block of gold belongs. It is this second use of the term ‘substance’ that we are 
most familiar with in contemporary discourse: the notion of ‘substance’ as stuff, to be 
contrasted with individuals by the fact that unlike individuals, it does not admit of 
counting. For example, there can be many gold bars, but not many golds. For Aristotle, 
a primary substance is an object  of predication; it cannot be properly  predicated of any 
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object. As Hacker puts it, ‘‘Socrates’ cannot be said to qualify anything, or be true of 
anything.’ (Hacker 2004 p.41). It is the secondary substance terms that, when predicated 
of individuals, categorize an individual thing as something of a given kind; for example, 
‘this is gold.’ The notion of a secondary  substance is close to the Aristotelian notion of 
‘form’, and as such can be used according to Aristotle to individuate individuals of a 
particular kind, or provide a criterion for counting them. So for example, to state ‘this is 
gold’ of a particular object, i.e. making a specification of an object’s secondary 
substance, is to specify the nature of the individual object.
The key characteristic of stuffs, or secondary substances, is that they are homogenous, 
or homologous, or homoeomerous; that is, almost any piece of portion taken of a 
substance will also be that substance kind. It is important to add ‘almost’ here, since 
modern science has since revealed that many substances or stuffs commonly thought to 
be fully  homoeomerous in Aristotle’s period have since been revealed to be 
homoeomerous only  down to the atomic level. Gold is more homoeomerous than wood, 
for example, since one can subdivide gold all the way down to atomic level and still 
have gold (though this fails to hold at divisions smaller than the atomic level); wood is 
clearly  not homoeomerous to this extent. Based on these observations, we should take 
the notion of homoeomery, or ‘like-parted-ness’ (Phillips 2009 p.97), to admit of degree, 
rather than being a binary notion that is either predicable or not of a substance.
Homoeomery: a substance S is homoeomerous to a degree x if for any portion s of S up 
to x, s necessarily is S.
If a substance is homoeomerous to a degree x, then it is anhomoeomerous past x; that is, 
beyond the point of x, s can fail to be S, hence the ‘necessarily’ clause in the definition 
of homoeomery. This means that past x, it  is an open question whether s is S; we need to 
know more before we can identify  this portion as being S. It may well be the case that 
all stuffs are homoeomerous to some degree; the point at which homoeomery breaks 
down for a substance will vary depending on the substance kind in question. We have 
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seen that gold is significantly  homoeomerous; for gold, x is the molecular level; below 
this level, gold is said to be anhomoeomerous. But how about fruitcake (Taylor 1985)? 
Fruitcake is plausibly a substance for which homeomery breaks down at the fully 
observable level; if we subdivide fruitcake continually, it will not be long before we 
come upon a portion whose nature, or status, we cannot at first specify, for example a 
sultana (Phillips 2009 p.98). A sultana taken by itself does not belong to the substance 
kind ‘fruitcake’: it is simply a sultana. A piece of fruitcake that is a sultana can fail to be 
fruitcake, and so we might say  that at the sultana-level, fruitcake as a substance kind is 
anhomoeomerous. However, taken in the context of a volume full of fruitcake, it is 
plausibly true to predicate an individual sultana to be of the substance kind ‘fruitcake’. 
This observation shows that the status of some portions of substances can depend on the 
nature of the surrounding substance: a sultana in a bowl of sultanas does not fall under 
fruitcake’, but a sultana in a bowl of fruitcake does. The fact that fruitcake as a 
substance is significantly anhomoeomerous even at the observable level is explained by 
the fact that fruitcake is a ‘bitty’ substance, having many different kinds of object as 
large parts, for example nuts and fruits (including sultanas).
The key point relevant to Phillips’ argument with reference to the fruitcake example and 
the definition of homoeomery above is an epistemological point; at the point at which a 
mass of stuff is anhomoeomerous, we cannot specify the nature of a part of that  stuff 
without taking into account the nature of the surrounding volume. A sultana will fall 
under ‘fruitcake’ if it is surrounded by fruitcake, and not if it is surrounded by sultanas. 
This epistemological observation is the consequence of an stuff being anhomoeomerous 
at some level; the problem of specification applies at the level of anhomoeomery. In 
order to specify the substance kind of an object or portion of stuff, we need to know 
about the context in which the stuff occurs.
Up to this point, we have been concerned only with substances; we have seen that 
different substances can be said to be homoeomerous down to different levels. Phillips 
builds the point  about homoeomery into his point concerning the nature of experience 
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via a well-worn analogy between stuffs and processes, discussed in Mourelatos (1978) 
and developed by Taylor (1985). It has commonly been noted that the event/process 
distinction and the individual/substance distinction are closely  analogous, with events 
and individuals sharing many  features, and processes and substances likewise. One 
example is countability. As Gill (1993) points out, events are intrinsically countable in a 
way processes are not, and the same is true with things and stuffs; the way in which 
these entities are individuated is largely the same. In the specific case of homoeomery, 
processes are plausibly homoeomerous to some degree, whereas events are not; events 
do not have a structure of parts of which we can predicate things that are true of the 
events themselves. Phillips (2009) gives the example of the process of walking: if 
person S walks for a period, then at each moment in this process, it is true to say that S 
is walking. However, if we single out S’s position at any moment in the process and 
consider it in isolation, it would in many cases be impossible to specify  whether S is 
walking, or instead standing in some odd position. The epistemological point again 
applies: to know whether S is at that moment walking, we need to be able to specify 
whether of not S is in the process of walking, and we cannot do this without knowing 
facts about S that obtain at earlier and/or later times; the analogue of the surrounding 
volume in the spatial case. The epistemological claim can be thought of as a thesis of 
explanatory  dependence: if a process is anhomoeomerous, the status of the temporal 
parts of the process is to be explained in terms of the status of the whole process.
Both processes and experiences are necessarily temporal entities; both occur over time. 
The shared temporal aspect is what allows Phillips to develop  his account of experience 
as anhomoeomerous  process. Phillips (2014a) states, quoting Dainton (2000):
‘When we come to explain the nature of the stream of consciousness there are 
significant, extended periods over which we must explain the properties of sub-
parts in terms of the properties of the whole duration and not vice-versa. That 
is, the stream is structured such that over short periods the explanatory 
direction runs from temporal whole to temporal parts.’ (Phillips 2014a p.96).
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As we have seen, if a process is homoeomerous then it can be analysed down to a series 
of independent short chunks or slices, which are taken to have explanatory  value for the 
whole that they constitute: the entity  itself. Phillips’ claim is that experience is an 
anhomoeomerous process; in that the temporal parts of an experience do not explain the 
existence of the experience itself, but vice-versa; the existence of the experience itself is 
explanatorily prior to the existence of its parts. We might refer to this notion as a kind of 
holism; the whole is taken to be prior to the parts in some sense to be specified. We 
might also refer to the contrasting view as a kind of atomism; the ‘atoms’ of an 
experience, or its parts, are taken to be in some sense prior to the experience as a whole 
(Lee 2014a, 2014b).
We are now in a position to see how Phillips’ conception of experience allows a 
response to the aforementioned postdiction cases to be formulated. The epistemological 
point was that  we (often) cannot say  at particular times what a subject is experiencing, 
as experiences are extended processes that are connected to form the stream of 
consciousness. Therefore, insofar as taking an Orwellian or  Stalinesque interpretation 
of the postdiction data involves specifying the nature of an experience at a time (for 
example, claiming with the Orwellian that ‘at t1, a duration d is represented in 
experience’), we should reject such interpretations. The epistemological consequence of 
experience being anhomoeomerous is that we cannot specify the nature of experience at 
a time in this manner. We might see the manner in which Phillips’ strategy  as avoiding 
the problem as similar in form to that of Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992), albeit with a 
very different conception of experience at hand. Both accounts hold that the question 
‘Orwellian or Stalinesque?’ in response to the problem posed by the postdiction cases 
falsely presupposes a model of experience that should be rejected. In Dennett’s case, it 
is the so-called ‘Cartesian materialist’ position that falsely has it that there is a time and 
a place in the brain where actual consciousness takes place; and in Phillips’ case it  is the 
assumption that we can specify the nature of experience at a time, where in actual fact 
(it is claimed), we cannot; all experiences are anhomoeomerous in that they  are 
dependent on past and future experience for their nature.
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The temporal correlation principle
Having already rejected the approach of Dennett and Kinsbourne, I now pose a problem 
for the account of Phillips. Phillips’ account of experience as an anhomoeomerous 
process seeks to allow the supporter of temporal mirroring to reject the Orwellian 
interpretation of the postdiction cases; indeed, it seeks to preclude the need for any 
mirroring-endangering interpretations at all, since such interpretations must involve 
stating facts about experience at  a time, which is something we cannot do if experience 
has this nature. Phillips’ account rests on three key claims: the claim that processes are 
like stuffs, and the claim that experiences are processes, and finally the claim that 
experiences are significantly  anhomoeomerous processes. The first of these claims I 
will leave alone. The second claim, that experience is a process, is a significant claim 
about the nature of experience. Since the question as to the nature of experience isn’t 
the central question of this essay, I will refrain from criticizing this claim, though it is a 
claim that  those who reject mirroring will also likely wish to reject; for example, Lee 
mounts a strong case against a ‘process’ view of experience in favour of an ‘atomic’ 
approach (Lee 2014a). The key  claim is that experience is anhomoeomerous, and it is 
this claim I argue is implausible, at least on a popular view in the broader philosophy of 
mind, when we consider the relationship between experiences and the neural processes 
that realize them.
The majority of the discussion of experience in Phillips (2009, 2010, 2014a, 2014b) 
focusses on the relationship between the structure of experience and the structure of its 
objects; no mention is made of the equally important relationship  between the structure 
of experiences and the structure of their physical realizers. The most straightforward 
way to think of the relationship between experiences and neural processes is, put 
simplistically, a straightforward correspondence in which the timing of experiences is 
intimately  related to the timings of their underlying neural processes. In the broader 
philosophy of mind, this kind of view has been associated with physicalism. On this 
picture, a token experience of, e.g., pain is realized by a specific neural process; for 
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example, C-fibres firing. Furthermore, we can individuate the neural states or events 
which are taken to be the realizers of the experiences as finely  or as broadly as we like 
on this picture for the important point to remain: individual experiences are realized by 
individual neural events and each experience has a neural ‘realization base’ (Kim 1992). 
Contrary  to this however, the view of experience Phillips seems to be presenting is one 
on which experiences can ‘float free’ of their neural realizers. The neural state of a 
subject’s brain immediately after A and before B in the color-phi case is presumably 
identical to the neural state of the same subject’s brain if she were to just experience A, 
without B occurring, yet Phillips’ account suggests that despite this fact, the subject will 
have different experiences in both cases, due to the fact that in the first case, a further 
experience at B takes place. Consider the following brief argument:
1) If experience is anhomoeomerous, we cannot specify  facts about its nature at a time 
without taking into account facts about experiences at earlier or later times.
2)  Facts about the timing of experiences (for example, ‘experience e begins at time t1’ 
or ‘part of experience e occurs at t2’) are facts about the nature of experience at a 
time.
3) We can specify facts about the timing of experiences.
4) Therefore, experience is not anhomoeomerous.
The premise doing most of the work in this argument is premise 3; why should we 
accept it? Lee (2014a) formulates the following plausible ‘temporal correlation 
principle’: 
TCP: ‘if two experiences are realized over the same interval or moment, 
then they themselves occupy the same moment or interval’ (Lee 2014a p.4). 
TCP is a principle concerning the the relationship between the timings of experiences 
and their neural realizers; more specifically, the claim that the timings of experiences 
and their realizers are systematically correlated. We needn’t read this principle as 
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entailing that experiences have the very same timings as their realizers (Lee: the 
stronger ‘temporal identity  principle’); the weaker temporal correlation principle is 
consistent with an experience happening, for example, at  the end of its neural realization 
process. But as we have seen, Phillips’ view of experiences as anhomoeomerous 
processes that are dependent for their specification on later experiences falls foul of this 
principle; an experience of the red dot in the color-phi scenario and an experience of a 
red dot outside this scenario are realized over the same moment, but on Phillips’ view, 
the experiences could differ in terms of their timings. That is, ‘the parts of an 
experience can happen at different times, despite being physically realized over the 
same temporal interval’ (Lee 2014a p.7). TCP entails premise 3 in the above argument, 
given that we can specify temporal facts about the neurological states that realize our 
experiences, and I take this to be an uncontroversial claim. All that is needed is a reason 
to support TCP, and the above argument can be made.
What reasons do we have for thinking that the temporal correlation principle TCP is a 
plausible principle? Lee (2014a) points out that it is very hard to make sense of the view 
that experience is anhomoeomerous in this way when we specifically consider the 
relationship  between experiences and their neural realizers. Lee considers a spatial 
analogue to Phillips’ proposal: consider the claim that experiences of different regions 
of space themselves occupy different regions of space, for example the claim that an 
experience of a banana is banana-shaped. If we consider this claim alongside the claim 
that experiences are anhomoeomerous, then we are forced into the conclusion that two 
experiences could be located in different regions of the brain whilst being physically 
realized in the same brain-shaped region. It  is very hard to make sense of this claim; 
however, the supporter of Phillips might simply respond that a fundamental difference 
in the perception of space and time allows us to rule out the idea that  experiences could 
be predicated with spatial properties in this regard. A rejection of Lee’s spatial analogy 
would be motivated by a claim similar to the ‘uniqueness’ claim central to Phillips’ 
argument for mirroring I described previously in chapter 3; if we reject that spatial 
properties can be predicated of temporal properties in the manner Lee suggests, then the 
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analogy will not hold. Nevertheless, the main point in favour of the temporal correlation 
principle is that it is entailed by any form of physicalism that holds that mental states 
and physical states are systematically correlated; and this is true on both type- and -
token identity  theories. On the type-identity  theory, for every mental property 
instantiated there is a (strictly) identical physical property; on the token-identity  theory 
for every actual object, event  or process, there is a (strictly) identical physical object, 
event or process. Both these physicalist theses entail the TCP, since on both theses, 
token neural states are taken to be strictly  identical to token mental states; the token-
identity  theory leaves open the possibility of particulars also having contingent mental 
properties, whilst the type-identity  theory  does not. If every mental state is identical to a 
physical state, and if experiences are mental states, then it follows that experiences will 
have both the same intrinsic and extrinsic properties as the neural states that realize 
them, and this will include properties of experiences such as ‘beginning at t1’, and other 
properties concerning the timing of experiences.
For our present purposes, the key claim to note is that any account that involves a denial 
of the temporal correlation principle will necessarily involve a denial of both type and 
token identity theory more generally as an option when it comes to explaining the 
nature of mental properties. This of course does not prove a view to be false if we don’t 
already assume some specific forms of physicalism to be true. It  does however, place 
serious metaphysical constraints on an account which we would like not to be burdened 
with. If it is indeed the case that holding experience to be anhomoeomerous entails the 
denial of some popular forms of physicalism, then this should make us (and more 
specifically, the advocate of mirroring) think very  carefully before adopting an account 
of experience along these lines. Grush’s original Orwellian interpretation provides just 
such an account without entailing any thesis that might force us into wider 
commitments when it comes to the nature of mind. Unfortunately, this option is 
unavailable to the advocate of mirroring, whose account of the relation between the 
temporal structure of experience and the temporal structure of its apparent objects is not 
consistent with an Orwellian interpretation. Therefore, without arguing explicitly for a 
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physicalist thesis, we should still conclude that Phillips’ response to the postdiction 
cases is unsatisfactory; the thesis provides a view of experience that is far from 
intuitive, and one that is incompatible with a major and popular thesis in the broader 
philosophy of mind.
Russell worlds
The conception of experience under discussion is a conception of experience as 
anhomoeomerous: a process extended in time, and dependent for its nature at a time on 
earlier or later experience-phases, such that we cannot specify the nature of experience 
at a time without knowing more about these earlier and later phases. Even leaving 
concerns about the temporal correlation principle aside, and focussing not on the 
physical realizers of experiences but the experiences themselves, another objection can 
be levelled against this picture. This is the objection that the claim about specifying the 
nature of experience is false: if we can after all specify the nature of experience at a 
time, then the claim that experience is anhomoeomerous is false. If it could be shown 
that this specification could (at least in principle) be made, then further doubt is case on 
Phillips’ conception of experience. Consider the following argument, closely related to 
the previous argument, but more general in form:
1) If experience is anhomoeomerous, we cannot specify  facts about its nature at a time 
without taking into account facts about experiences at earlier or later times.
2) We can specify  facts about  the nature of experience at a time without taking into 
account facts about experiences at earlier or later times.
3) Therefore, experience is not anhomoeomerous.
What reasons can be advanced in favour of premise 2? Firstly, we might wish to make a 
common-sense argument for this premise, based on observations about how we 
ordinarily take experience to be. At this current moment, for example, I seem to have no 
problem specifying various facts about my conscious experience: that I am 
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concentrating on writing, that I am hearing the hum of my laptop, or that I am looking at 
a certain visual scene. However, these specifications are of experience at a ‘high level’ 
of observation; with regard to the postdiction cases we have been discussing (and which 
the view that experience is anhomoeomerous is trying to account for), experience at  the 
level of seconds and nanoseconds is the focus. A better argument is needed for the 
ability  to specify  facts about experience at a time at the more fine-grained temporal 
level than simply making assertions about what I am now experiencing. A more 
promising way to argue for premise 2 in the above argument is, I argue, to consider a 
notion that has been called a ‘Russell world’. In ‘The Analysis Of Mind’ (Russell 1921), 
Russell invites us to consider a world identical to the actual world, but that sprang into 
existence only moments ago; this world is identical to the actual world but  has a 
different history, one that began just before the present moment. If it is true that the 
actual world could be this world, then the Russell-world is conceivable. Though the 
example of a Russell world has been used to illustrate a skeptical scenario concerning 
our knowledge of the actual world, the conclusion Russell himself draws (and a 
conclusion we should consider too) is that ‘there is no necessary connection between 
events at different times’ (Russell 1921, lecture 10). If the state of the world as it is at the 
present moment could have emerged a moment ago, rather than as a product of long 
causal history, then the state of the world at a time cannot depend on the state of the 
world at a past time. We might also consider a closely-related case, a Russell2-world: a 
world identical to the actual world, but  suddenly goes out of existence  immediately 
following the present moment. If a Russell2-world is a real possibility, there is no 
necessary  connection between present events and future events; the state of the world at 
the present moment cannot depend on the state of the world at  a future time. 
Experiences, conceived of as either events or processes, cannot be anhomoeomerous if 
the Russell-world and the Russell2-worlds are real possibilities (i.e could be the actual 
world), since as we have seen for experience to be anhomoeomerous is for it  to depend 
constitutively on past or future times. The ‘necessary connection’ between events at the 
present moment and past  and future events cannot exist  if either of these worlds are 
possible, but premise 2 of the argument relies upon this necessary connection. If the 
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Russell-world (and the Russell2-world) are genuine possibilities, then we can specify 
facts at a time without taking into account facts at other times, since there is no 
necessary  connection between these facts and present facts. As Phillips himself 
concedes (Phillips 2010 p.181), the case from Russell worlds could be strengthened by 
making a similar claim specific to physical facts. If  we restrict the class of facts that do 
not depend on facts at other times to physical facts, and then hold to a physicalist thesis 
on which mental facts are identified with, or supervene on, physical facts, then it 
follows that mental facts (including facts about experience) do not depend on facts at 
other times. Here is a more explicit contrast  with the thesis that experience is 
anhomoeomerous: experience cannot be anhomoeomerous if this argument is sound, 
though it clearly faces the same partial issue as the previous argument against 
anhomoeomery  in that it assumes a popular view in the philosophy of mind (some form 
of physicalism) that nevertheless some may be reluctant to subscribe to.
It is clear to see that the Russell-world cases rely explicitly upon a move that has been 
controversial in contemporary  metaphysics: the move from conceivability to 
metaphysical possibility. The reasoning in favour of the argument above, more 
explicitly stated, runs as follows: If Russell-worlds are metaphysical possible, then 
premise 2 of the argument is true. Russell-worlds are conceivable. What is conceivable 
is metaphysically possible. Therefore, Russell-worlds are metaphysically possible. 
Therefore premise 2 is true. Perhaps this move from conceivability  to metaphysical 
possibility is the obvious step  in the argument that the supporter of Phillips’ view of 
experience would wish to challenge. However, this challenge would involve engaging 
in a wider and deeper debate concerning the metaphysics of modality. Given that the 
claim that Russell-worlds are conceivable is highly  plausible (it is hard not  to accept 
that a hypothetical God, if he had wanted, could have created the world as it is a 
moment ago, or obliterate it  a moment hence), and given that a special reason or 
argument is needed to rule out the inference to possibility, I conclude that the Russell-
world cases pose a strong prima facie challenge to the view that experience is 
anhomoeomerous. 
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Aside from these concerns, we might also advance a common-sense critique of Phillips’ 
view that  experience is anhomoeomerous. Rather than being a straightforward 
interpretation of the postdiction data, Phillips’ response to the aforementioned cases is a 
full-blown thesis concerning the relationship  between the stream of consciousness, and 
the individual stages, or experiences, that make the stream of consciousness. If 
experience is anhomoeomerous, then the nature of some experiences depends on later 
experiences in the stream of consciousness, and so it follows that it is the stream of 
consciousness from which the individual experiences derive, and not vice versa. 
Individual experiences do not in fact make up or constitute the stream of consciousness 
at all, but  derive from it; their individuation depends on the stream of consciousness, 
which is metaphysically  prior to the individual experiences. I think that it is hard to 
make sense of this view, at  least without rejecting a common and compelling notion of 
experience, on which it is the stream of consciousness that is derivative from the 
individual experiences, and not vice versa (though of course, this has not explicitly been 
argued for here). Insofar as we are apt to think of the stream of consciousness as a 
succession of experiences, then it is perfectly natural to think of the stream of 
consciousness as nothing other than a collection of experiences, unified by some 
relation such that adjacent experiences will form the sort of continuity we generally take 
our conscious experience to exhibit. Phillips’ conception of experience as 
anhomoeomerous involves rejecting this compelling picture, as well as rejecting the 
plausible temporal correlation principle mentioned above; furthermore, the view faces a 
special problem in having to rule out Russell-world cases. For these reasons, I think we 
are justified in rejecting Phillips’ interpretation of these cases. The clear alternative, an 
Orwellian interpretation on which it is ‘overwriting’ in experience that gives rise to 
these illusions, looks most plausible in light  of this. And if this is the correct 
interpretation, a significant challenge is posed for the supporter of mirroring: either 
explain how an Orwellian interpretation is not inconsistent with mirroring, or 
demonstrate more clearly  why  an Orwellian interpretation is the wrong interpretation of 
these cases.
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Conclusion
The postdiction cases discussed above have been presented as a challenge to the theorist 
who holds that experiences inherit the temporal properties of the objects they  represent. 
I have addressed one response to this proposed challenge, and argued that it  is 
unconvincing; the supporter of mirroring must propose a better interpretation of the data 
to stave off the worry  that the natural and best interpretation shows that  the temporal 
properties of an experience and its objects can diverge. The cases as I have presented 
them certainly do not conclusively  show that ‘mirroring’ is false; there is much more to 
be said about the merits and problems concerned with Grush’s model, and also that of 
Dainton’s approach. What I have tried to show, however, is that adopting an 
‘anhomoeomerous’ model of experience and interpreting the postdiction cases in light 
of this in order to preserve the inheritance thesis is problematic. The burden is therefore 
on the supporter of mirroring to demonstrate in a more satisfactory manner how these 
cases are to be dealt  with on his/her view; in the absence of such an explanation, I 
contend that we are justified in taking postdiction cases to pose a clear counterexample 
to metrical mirroring, and hold that the temporal structure of experience and the 
temporal structure of its objects can diverge.
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5. Conclusion and further issues: the diachronic unity of experience
Conclusion
The topic of this essay has been the relationship between two temporal structures; that 
of experience itself, and that of the objects/events (re)presented in experience. After 
making clear why a bare ‘snapshot’ view of experience must be ruled out, with 
reference to three plausible constraints on temporal experience, I first set out Dainton’s 
approach to the debate, arguing that it does not  adequately capture most clearly the issue 
to be discussed: the nature of the relationship between the two temporal structures. I 
then outlined a class of ‘mirroring’ views, with the aim of arguing that a strong form of 
mirroring, metrical mirroring, on which experiences inherit both ordering and duration 
relations from their objects, is false. In chapter 3 I presented several ways a major 
argument for metrical mirroring from transparency, that of Phillips (2010), could be 
resisted; either by calling for clarification concerning the specific notion of transparency 
required to make the argument, or casting doubt upon the notion of ‘seeming’ that plays 
a vital role in the argument. In chapter 4, I considered some well-worn empirical cases 
which I argued provide a further reason to reject metrical mirroring; cases where the 
two temporal structures appear to diverge in a manner not consistent with the mirroring 
claim. I then considered one possible response, Phillips’ view of experience as 
anhomoeomerous, and argued that this is not a plausible way to conceive of our 
experiences. Recall that  the view under question, metrical mirroring, has it that both the 
succession and duration relations of events in experience are mirrored by experience 
itself. In Chapter 3, I considered cases where this thesis seems to fail for succession; the 
cases of the sensory deprivation tank and attention-shifting. In Chapter 4, I considered 
cases where this thesis seems to fail for duration; the cases of color-phi and cutaneous 
rabbit. In both cases, there seems to be (re)presentation of the temporal property in 
question without an associated experience possessing that temporal property; if the 
previous arguments are sound, then this constitutes a reasonable case against the 
mirroring principles previous outlined. Nothing in my  critique rules out a structural 
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mirroring constraint on temporal experience (where only distinct stages of a perceived 
scene are mirrored by the experience itself); however, this is a very weak constraint, and 
one which is undoubtedly not robust enough to do the work required for either Phillips, 
or others who would  wish to advocate his ontology of experience.
The above critique was intended to relate to the question as to the nature of the 
relationship  between the two temporal structures. A central query  along those lines 
might be: ‘do experiences mirror their objects in terms of temporal properties?’. I 
believe that  we have reason to believe the answer to be ‘no’, based on the various 
considerations advanced in this essay. With this thought set out, it  is instructive to return 
to the secondary question as to the nature of experience itself over time; the question 
that Dainton (2000, 2010a) seems most motivated by  when formulating his own 
taxonomy of cinematic, retentionalist and extensionalist views. In this, the last chapter 
of the essay, I wish to briefly  reconsider these views, and in particular the retentionalist 
view, which is most naturally suggested if the aforementioned claims concerning the 
viability of metrical mirroring are upheld. 
81
Extensionalism and retentionalism revisited
Dainton’s three models of temporal experience (clockwise from top left): cinematic (Grush 
2007), retentionalist, and extensionalist (Dainton 2010a)
As we have already seen, the views in Dainton’s taxonomy differ as to the extent to 
which either the content  of the experience or the experience itself are held to be 
extended in time. The cinematic view is presented as having both the content and the 
experience to be non-extended, or at  least very short if not momentary. I argued that  two 
plausible constraints on temporal experience ruled this approach out: the 
phenomenological constraint (PC) that we perceive temporal properties themselves, and 
the relational constraint (RC) that in order to perceive temporal relations, we must 
perceive both relata in a single experience. The cinematic ‘snapshot’ picture of temporal 
experience simply does not have the resources to accommodate these constraints, for to 
satisfy them requires that at least the content of an experience be temporally  extended, 
in order to perceive both relata in a single experience. Furthermore, the question I have 
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been considering as to the relationship between the two temporal structures would be 
irrelevant if the snapshot view were true, since neither the content of the experience not 
its temporal structure are taken to have any interesting kind of temporal structure on this 
picture. This observation is true also for the view of Dennett  (1991) and Dennett and 
Kinsbourne (1992), which I have also discussed; if we wish to uphold that the 
phenomenological constraint is genuine, and furthermore that experiences are unified 
over time in the manner in which they seem to be, we should reject Dennett’s anti-
realist picture of temporal experience.
With the snapshot view ruled out, we should consider which of the remaining views 
follows most naturally  from the considerations that have been advanced against 
mirroring. The answer is clearly the retentionalist view, which envisions experience as 
momentary  or short, but nevertheless apprehending a temporal spread of content. On the 
retentionalist view, there is a significant divergence between the duration (if any) of the 
experience, and the duration apprehended in the experience; and since it is metrical 
mirroring (inheritance of both duration and order) that is the target of my critique, it 
follows that metrical mirroring cannot be the case if experience is retentional in this 
way. By contrast, the metrical mirroring view finds its home most naturally  in an 
extensionalist framework, where the duration and ordering relations of both experience 
and object are taken to align. In Dainton’s framework, that means that experiences 
decompose into further experiences as parts, which are unified over time by the relation 
of co-consciousness; however, this is by no means the only way of filling out the 
extensionalist thesis, which may allow of other kinds of unity of time.
There is much more to be said than this concerning the relative merits and criticisms of 
these two competing views in the philosophy of temporal consciousness; Dainton 
(2000, 2010a) gives a full treatment of the debate between these two rival views of 
experience. Dainton himself subscribes to extensionalism, which he argues is the only 
view that does fill justice to the ‘naive’ considerations advanced by  Phillips (2014b) and 
others than we directly perceive temporal properties. The retentionalist view, by 
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contrast, will clearly  have to rely upon some additional cognitive ingredients to be a 
viable account of experience; since for the retentionalist it is possible for an experience 
to be very short  but its content extended, some ‘filling in’ on the part of the brain must 
occur in order to create the presentation of a temporal interval, to avoid the very  odd 
conclusion that the content  of an experience increasingly ‘lags behind’ the experience 
itself. The most natural cognitive addition to make here may involve memory, 
specifically  ‘retentions’, which are taken to be a kind of backwards-looking 
representation that creates the impression of an extended period of time despite the fact 
that the experience itself is shorter (e.g. Husserl 1964). In order to sustain their account, 
the retentionalist must provide detail concerning the precise way  in which the brain is 
capable of producing this impression, whilst still allowing for the phenomenological 
constraint to be upheld. This requirement to both do justice to how temporal phenomena 
seem to us, but also reject the mirroring of temporal structures, is I contend the central 
challenge for a successful retentionalist  account. The motivation provided for 
retentionalism by the arguments made in this essay is therefore only half the story: the 
retentionalist must provide this extra detail in order for their view to be upheld as more 
plausible than extensionalism, all-things-considered. Since there is not time for this 
more detailed inquiry  here, I merely intend for the conclusion of this essay to be that we 
should cast doubt on the notion of mirroring; whether retentionalism is in fact the 
correct view of experience over time is a further matter that requires further work, 
though anybody who is doubtful of the kind of mirroring proposed by Phillips (2010) 
and others may well be naturally drawn to a retentionalist view of experience.
Unity and overlap
Aside from these concerns, the final issue I wish to discuss is that of the unity  of 
experience over time, with regard to the retentionalism vs extensionalism debate. In 
motivating my inquiry in chapter 1, I set out what I called the diachronic unity 
constraint (UC); the view that any account of temporal experience should allow for 
experiences to be unified over time. The stream of consciousness seems unified when 
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we attend to our own experience; our conscious experience admits of being broken 
down into individual experiences such as an experience of a blue object, or a high-
pitched note, but these individual experiences seem to flow one-into-the-other. How 
exactly  is it that experiences are unified over time such that we are given this 
seamlessness in experience? Dainton (2000, 2010a) claims that the extensionalist view 
of experience can account for this constraint better than the retentionalist approach, and 
presses a concern against  the retentionalist which he calls the ‘problem of repeated 
contents’. I wish here to outline this objection but also partially defend the retentionalist 
on this count, arguing that the extensionalist too faces equally serious worries 
concerning their ability to provide a coherent account of unified experience over time. It 
is instructive to first consider the notion of experiential ‘overlap’ with regard to the 
question at hand. To use common terminology chiefly  associated with mereology, if two 
entities overlap, they  must share proper parts, or have parts in common; the notion of 
overlap is thus intimately connected to the notion of parthood (Varzi 2015, section 2.2). 
Thus, when we speak of two experiences, or two contents, overlapping, we need to be 
able to make sense of the idea that  experiences and contents can have proper parts. To 
enter into a full investigation on how experiential parts may be individuated is beyond 
the scope of this essay; it will suffice to say here that we can coherently make sense of 
the notion of part being applied both to experiences and their contents. That is to say, we 
can plausibly  talk of ‘parts of an experience’ or ‘parts of the content of an experience’ 
without requiring more information as to how those parts are individuated. Based on the 
notion of experiences or their contents possessing parts, the notion of overlap can be 
used both by the retentionalist and the extensionalist to explain the unity and continuity 
of experience over time: the diachronic unity of experience. For the extensionalist (e.g. 
Dainton 2000), experiences themselves share proper parts by  overlapping, guaranteeing 
a seamless series of experiences in the conscious mind of the perceiver. For the 
retentionalist (e.g. Broad 1923), it  is only the content  of the experiences that overlaps, 
whilst the experiences themselves do not, guaranteeing nonetheless a seamless stream 
of experiential content in the mind of the perceiver. 
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For the retentionalist, and perhaps also he/she who is skeptical of mirroring theses based 
on the considerations I have advanced in this essay, talk of temporal parts of an 
experience will be unwelcome, especially  if those parts are taken to match in some way 
the parts of the scene which is being experienced (as Dainton 2000, 2010a advocates 
under the banner of ‘extensionalism’). This is because for the retentionalist, experiences 
themselves have no significant temporal structure or extent; they are ‘atomistic’ (Lee 
2014a, 2014b). Since for the retentionalist, experiences are not extended in time over 
any significant interval, and do not decompose into smaller experiences that are their 
parts, experiential overlaps (if such an idea can be made sense of on retentionalism) will 
not guarantee the required continuity of experience. Therefore, if the retentionalist is to 
make use of the notion of overlap  to guarantee experiential continuity, it must be 
overlap at the level of experiential content, rather than experience itself. Just such an 
account is found in Broad (1923), whose application of this notion is depicted in 
Dainton (2010a) as follows:
Diagram from Dainton (2010a) 
The above diagram represents the retentionalist view supplemented with a notion of 
overlapping contents to create continuous experiencing by  a subject over time. A1-A3 
represent individual experiences, (or ‘acts of awareness’ in Broad’s terminology), whilst 
C, D, E and F represent a sequence of entities experienced, for example musical tones. 
C and D fall within A1’s ‘specious present’; they are the content of the subject’s 
experience A1. Furthermore, D and E fall within A2’s specious present. To say  that A1 
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and A2 overlap  in terms of their content is to say that the tone D is part of the content of 
A1 and A2; D is a proper part had by both contents. So too for E with regard to A2 and 
A3; the contents of these experiences overlap in virtue of both containing the tone E. In 
this way, the retentionalist (in this case, Broad 1923) is able to account for the 
diachronic unity  and continuity of experience: individual experiences are unified over 
time to form a continuous stream of consciousness by possessing overlapping contents.
The chief concern levelled against such an attempt to satisfy the diachronic unity 
constraint on the part of the retentionalist has been made most forcefully by  Dainton 
(2000, 2010a), who terms it the ‘problem of repeated contents’. Dainton argues that  an 
implausible conclusion that follows from the above picture is that some contents will be 
repeated in experience; namely, the contents that figure in multiple acts of awareness; 
and this is manifestly at odds with everyday  experience. Take, for example, the tone D, 
which is part of the content of A1 and A2; A1 and A2 ‘overlap’ by  both containing D in 
their content. However, the fact that two successive experiences contain the note D in 
their content would seem to lead to that content being repeated in experience: thus, on 
Broad’s picture, the subject would experience C, D, D again, E, E again and then F. 
However, this is at  odds with what the picture is meant to represent, which is an 
experience of C, D, E and F. That D and E appear to be repeated on Broad’s picture is a 
serious worry for Dainton, who claims that it shows that the retentionalist cannot appeal 
to overlap  of contents and at the same time remain true to the phenomenological reality 
of experience. Dainton terms this problem ‘The problem of repeated contents’ (Dainton 
2000).
I have no adequate reply on behalf of the retentionalist  to the problem Dainton poses; 
but since it is not my aim in this essay to fully  defend retentionalism as a theory of 
experience, I contend that this does not challenge my conclusion, which is that we have 
reason to doubt a mirroring constraint on temporal experience. However, since many  of 
those who wish to deny mirroring in the way I have suggested might also wish to 
advocate something along the lines of retentionalism, it is worth saying something 
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instructive in response to Dainton’s argument. I argue here that Dainton’s solution to the 
problem on behalf of the extensionalist, also employing the notion of ‘overlap’, faces 
several worries as serious as the retentionalist’s problem of repeated contents. The 
notion Dainton proposes in order to avoid the problem of repeated contents is that of 
overlap at the level of experience itself. Since for the extensionalist, experiences 
themselves are extended in time, and furthermore mirror their objects in terms of 
duration and ordering, the extensionalist can allow that experiences themselves can 
overlap in order to ground continuity. The picture Dainton advocates on behalf of the 
extensionalist is as follows:
Diagram from Dainton (2010a)
On Dainton’s picture, the experiences (or ‘acts of awareness’) are themselves extended, 
and themselves overlap; there is overlap  of both experiential content and the 
experiences themselves.  Within one act of awareness A1, contents C and D are 
experienced together. The new picture is intended to avoid the problem of repeated 
contents as follows. The problem derived from having the very  same content being 
reiterated in a successive experience. However, on Dainton’s picture, this reiteration 
does not occur: whilst D (for example) is part of two distinct experiences A1 and A2, 
these experiences themselves overlap, sharing a proper part which has D as its content. 
This shared proper part only occurs once, and so it follows that D is only experienced 
once, and not repeated. In this way, the phenomenological reality of experiencing C, D, 
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E and F once each is respected. As Dainton puts it, ‘if A1 and A2 are discrete acts then 
D is experienced twice-over. But if A1 and A2 overlap in the manner indicated, D is 
experienced just once: by the episode of sensing [experiencing] that is common to A1 
and A2.’ (Dainton 2010a, section 5.4).
It may be the case that Dainton’s overlap model successfully avoids the problem of 
repeated contents, and in conceiving of experiences as extended phases rather than 
discrete acts gains an advantage over the rival theory. However, the notion of overlap at 
the level of experience itself raises some equally problematic questions. Both Strawson 
(2009) and Gallagher (2003) point out that the account does not do justice to our 
ordinary  phenomenology when we reflect on our own experiences; we cannot discern 
the gaps between our experiences (an observation made previously in this essay in 
chapter 3), still less that our experiences overlap in the manner that Dainton suggests. 
But furthermore, and more seriously, Dainton’s account faces another problem. In the 
diagram above, experiences A1, A2 and A3 overlap, which grounds their continuity  in 
the stream of consciousness. However, it is possible to think of cases where what is 
experienced in succession is experienced as continuous, but without the experiential 
overlap; such cases may show that experiential overlap does not fully capture the 
continuity  of conscious experience on Dainton’s picture. One example, given in Bayne 
(2001), concerns a case where a subject enjoys two token ‘D’ experiences at a time (as 
opposed to one in the diagram above), D1 and D2. Suppose in this new case that D1 is 
experienced together with C, and that D2 is experienced together with E; that is, the act 
of awareness A1 has C and D1 as its contents, and the act of awareness A2 has D2 and 
E as its contents. For this case, Dainton’s overlap model predicts that the subject in 
question will not experience D1 and D2 as continuous, as there is no experiential 
overlap between A1 and A2. However, as Bayne points out, it seems highly plausible 
that the subject will experience D1 and D2 as continuous, since she may well not be 
able to distinguish the two experiences on phenomenal introspection; the two token 
experiences occur at the same time (Bayne 2001 p. 88). This worry, and the worry that 
the proposed experiential overlaps are not given in our phenomenology  as we might 
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expect, both give reason to doubt that experiential overlap  is a viable model of 
experiential unity and continuity. Gallagher (2003) and others raise further worries 
against Dainton’s view, some of which are countered in Dainton (2003), but which I 
shall not explore here.
Unity and continuity of experience over time
The question of overlap with regard to experience, and the broader question of how 
experiences are unified over time to produce continuity  in conscious experience, both 
deserve a far more thorough treatment than I have given them here. The purpose of the 
above discussion was to highlight two key  points that I take to be instructive to the 
debate that I have been considering in this essay. I have argued that we have reason to 
doubt that metrical mirroring is true with respect  to experience and its objects. Those 
who reject mirroring may be drawn most naturally to a ‘retentionalist’ view of 
experience, in Dainton’s terminology; conversely, those who advocate metrical 
mirroring may be drawn most naturally  to an ‘extensionalist’ position (though neither 
stance on mirroring entails either retentionalism or extensionalism with regard to 
experience). I have tried to show that whilst the retentionalist  faces a serious worry  in 
the form of the ‘problem of repeated contents’, so too does the extensionalist with his 
notion of experiential overlap. We might generalize these worries for each theory to the 
conclusion that for any view of experience, a key question to be answered more 
adequately is the question of how individual experiences are unified over time to make 
up a continuous stream of consciousness that appears seamless to the perceiver. This is 
not the same question as the question I addressed in chapter 4, with regard to the 
‘homoeomery’ of experience; the question is not whether the experiential part is prior to 
the whole or vice versa, but the relation individual experiences must stand in over time 
in order to account for the diachronic unity of conscious experience. Both the 
retentionalist and the extensionalist require a better theory  of diachronic unity of 
experience. Just  as much recent work in the philosophy of mind (for example, that of 
Bayne and Chalmers 2003) has focussed on the synchronic unity of conscious 
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experience (that is, unity of consciousness at  a time), there is still much work to be done 
in providing an adequate account on the diachronic unity  of conscious experience. 
Reflection on the retentionalism/extensionalism distinction and the shortcomings of 
existing attempts to provide such an account in terms of overlap indicates this area of 
the philosophy of mind and temporal consciousness that is undoubtedly ripe for future 
research.
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